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Abstract
A specter is haunting the U.S. Intelligence Community, and this specter is intelligence failure.
Up to the present day the Intelligence Community (IC) continues to be mired with allegations of
intelligence failure from the media, policymakers, academics, and practitioners alike. An initial
review of literature shows a common definition of intelligence failure remains elusive and
deficient. This study seeks to add to the scholarly discourse and benefit continued research
around intelligence failure, through an attempt to produce a working definition through a
systematic review of existing definitions. This study used a systematic review method to
examine over 210 sources from Taylor & Francis, JSTOR, & Google Scholar to develop a
working definition of intelligence failure based on a wide sample of literature. 33 definitions
were derived and analyzed off of this review.
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Introduction
A specter haunts the U.S. Intelligence Community, and this specter is intelligence failure.
Since the origins of the National Security Act of 1947, the Intelligence Community (IC) has
sought to make up for the failure of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, even up to the present day
the IC continues to be scarred with allegations of intelligence failure. These alleged failures are
wide ranging; Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs debacle, numerous coups amid the Cold War, the
Iran-Contra affair, 9-11, Iraq WMDs, COVID-19, and the recent January 6 Capitol Insurrection
are only a small sample of failures often attributed to the IC. As a result, the scarlet letter of
intelligence failure tends to be cast broadly. Yet, the threshold that divides intelligence success
from intelligence failure remains unclear, and there is no clear approach to studying the causes of
intelligence failure (Gill & Phythian, 2018).
Therefore, the fundamental question of inquiry in this thesis is: what is intelligence
failure? The discourse of this question is often played out through very public congressional
hearings and amid the media. A common reality consists of the ritualistic finger-pointing barrage
between practitioners, the media, and policy makers (Zegart, 2007). Academics have also sought
to further refine a sensible definition of the underlying foundations that cause intelligence failure,
but the outcome has been a multi-layered puzzle. The academic and practitioner line of inquiry
has been mostly dominated by case studies and memoirs that are limited in scope (Johnston,
2005). An initial assessment of the discourse confirms it is significantly limited.
Dahl (2013), Bar-Joseph & McDermott (2017), and Gill & Phythian (2018) call on future
research to compare and examine success and failures. Some authors have explored this avenue
to add to the exhaustion of intelligence failure case studies. Other scholars within intelligence
studies seek greater emphasis on empirical and mixed research methods similar to the premier
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work of Amy Zegart, in Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. However, there
seems to be a lack of acknowledgement that the first building block towards more empirical
research requires a greater discussion of definitions and adequate cumulation of existing
research. The lack of common definition establishes the problem statement. That problem
statement remains a puzzle that requires greater discussion across disciplines. One aim of this
research is to identify and close gaps within existing definitions.
The stalemate has some parallel lines to other broadly used terms that are not so well
defined. De Mauro, Greco, & Grimaldi (2015) conducted an analysis to identify themes and
define “big data”. The core of their argument runs similar to the puzzled discourse of intelligence
failure. Intelligence failure, like big data, has ubiquitous usage across the domains of academia,
intelligence professionals, politicians, and the media. Such frequent usage of a term in many
contexts can run the risk of hindering the evolution of the concept (De Mauro, Greco, &
Grimaldi, 2015). Through their analysis they argued the importance that “A convincing
definition of a concept is an enabler of its scientific development” (De Mauro, Greco, &
Grimaldi, 2015, p.101).
The broader aim that animated this thesis was to generate a deeper working definition of
intelligence failure, which could contribute positively to scholarly debate. What is intelligence
failure? What are the common themes and categories? What might definitions in this sample be
missing? An initial assumption examined is the use of normative absolutes to define intelligence
failure (or deny its existence), and this ignores core tenets of estimative realities that surround the
profession of intelligence. Defining intelligence failure helps provide the necessary building
block towards developing a framework aligned to estimative probabilities, which might enable a
fairer scholarly discourse that appreciates the complex puzzles that surround intelligence failures

2

and intelligence successes alike. The approach utilized here used a literature review and a
systematic review that may benefit future analysis of intelligence failure.
The first phase was the literature review. The literature review provides a general
assessment of definitions of intelligence failure and common categories. Despite not being
exhaustive, literature reviews help to refine what has been written about, in relation to
intelligence failure. However, while the literature review is necessary it is not sufficient.
Literature reviews only provide a limited sample and may become suspect to potential biases that
ignore other relevant literature (Coulthart, 2017). For this reason, a systematic review provided a
means to close existing gaps of available definitions and categories of intelligence failure.
The second phase was the systematic review. The purpose of the systematic review was
to analyze a wider array of literature relating to intelligence failure, in order to refine a working
definition and analytical framework for discussing intelligence failure. What are common
patterns in definitions? What aspects might these definitions be missing? A systematic review
provides a deeper framework. More importantly, a systematic review helps to address the lack of
structured processes within intelligence studies (Marrin, 2016). A cumulative analysis of
literature provides a foundation to build new knowledge that can evaluate cases, in a manner that
is fair and reasonable (Marrin, 2016). The objective of the completion of the systematic review
was to refine a working deeper definition, while also closing blind spots that may exist within
existing definitions.
The research contains five sections. These sections include methodology, literature
review, systematic review results, discussion, and a conclusion. First, the methodology provides
the basis for how sources are examined and the systematic processes that are used to derive
definitions. Second, the literature review focuses on the general body of knowledge that is
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known within intelligence failure. The systematic review fills in the gaps of the literature review.
Third, the findings of the systematic review are provided in some detail. Fourth, the discussion
elaborates on findings and the broader context of what they may mean for intelligence failures.
Lastly, the research provides a conclusion aimed towards addressing future avenues of research.
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Methodology & Research Design
A literature review and a systematic review were the core basis for research design. The
aim of the systematic review was to examine the most relevant literature pertaining to definitions
of intelligence failure. Based on an analysis of these definitions a working definition and
conceptual model were proposed for future research. The definition and model aimed to assess
intelligence failures based on common themes that arise with use of probability-based
assessments.

Figure 1.1: Research Design
Literature Review
Literature reviews provided a broad base line understanding of a given subject. As such,
the literature was limited in terms of rigor comparative to a systematic review and may omit
relevant studies do to bias or inexperience with the subject matter (Coulthart, 2017). The
literature review designed for this research aimed to add general context of relevant terms and
research that explores the topic of intelligence failure. The literature on intelligence failure was
5

expansive; given this was the case a series of widely known sources were examined as a basis to
build on general concepts.
The literature review included various books, academic journals, and published pieces in
mainstream media. Using a diverse array of sources, the search criteria was broadly examined
under “intelligence failure” and “intelligence” more broadly as a field of study. Not all the
authors aimed to identify intelligence failure, but they provided insights in various aspects that
were attributed to intelligence failure. In most cases, the literature review consisted of sources
that were already known to the researcher through previous studies.
Some of the sources examined were widely cited within the intelligence studies field.
These included Robin Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning & Decision (1962), Richard Betts
various articles and publications, Mark Lowenthal’s book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
(2017), Robert Jervis’ book. Why intelligence fails: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the
Iraq War (2010), Eric Dahl’s book Intelligence & Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from
Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (2013), and Amy Zegart’s groundbreaking study Spying Blind:
The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (2007).
A myriad of academic articles existed across the literature that pertained to case studies
of intelligence failure. Once again, these provided only a small sample of the wide sample on the
topic. However, they did provide a starting point. These substantive sources highlighted the
importance of using a literature review as a building block to understand general concepts and
discourse that has taken place, but further analysis through a systematic review helped cover
some of the gaps.
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Systematic Review
The Cochrane group defines a systematic review as a method that is explicit and
identifies, selects, and appraises relevant research critically (Cochrane Collaboration, 2016).
Systematic reviews provide an explicit basis for the process where assumptions and methods are
clear for examination from external parties (Temple University Library, 2020). Systematic
reviews may be heavily leveraged in the medical field, but this framework of transparent
methodology of sourcing is applicable for assessing a wide array of literature. Systematic
reviews provide transparent mode of analysis that are encouraged within the Intelligence
Community.
The systematic review, in this sense, aimed alleviate traditional limitations of bias that
can occur within literature reviews (Coulthart, 2017). Literature reviews do not detail underlying
assumptions or selection for sources contained, and thus may be susceptible to underlying biases
(Temple University, 2020). This does not mean systematic reviews are completely free of bias
either. The potential still exists, especially related to assessing high-quality versus low-quality of
studies.
The aim of the systematic review was three-fold. The first aim was to determine if a
widely accepted definition of intelligence failure exists. The second aim was to synthesize a
working definition for intelligence failure, in the event there was not a widely accepted
definition. This definition provided a foundation to synthesize dimensions, which could further
be assessed in future research. The third aim was to use provide insights for future conceptual
framework research. In an ironic twist, both systematic reviews and intelligence failure share the
common trait of unclear definitions.
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Martinic, Pieper, Glatt, and Puljak (2019) examined the definition of systematic review.
Through (ironically again) a systematic review they found that of a sample of 533 sources, only
188 provided a definition of systematic review (Martinic, Pieper, Glatt, and Puljak, 2019). The
most commonly used definition came from Cochrane, but definitions were vague and not widely
accepted (Martinic, Pieper, Glatt, & Puliak, 2019).
A relevant bias to consider was publication bias, or author bias. These biases tie to the
potential notion of unblinded bias. Unblinded bias consists of selecting sources based on a
preference for a particular author or publication (Morissette, Tricco, Horsley, Chen, and Moher,
2011). This systematic review attempted mitigate the risk of these biases through the use of two
separate data bases and a scholarly search engine. All of these sources contained a variety of
peer-reviewed journals and books. A variety of sources and authors were available based on an
initial assessment of the sample.
Morissette, Tricco, Horsley, Chen, and Moher (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of
blinded versus (not knowing the author, publication etc.) or unblinded bias did not find a
statistically significant difference between the six studies that qualified their research criteria.
Only two studies on the topic determined there was a high risk of bias related to blinded versus
unblinded practitioners (Morissette et al, 2011). The latter point here noted one potential
weakness with systematic review. Overly robust selection criteria can turn a large sample into a
relatively small sample. A small sample can further limit generalizability.
A general framework for systematic reviews includes: a research question, sources
searched that include replicable strategy, inclusion/exclusion criteria, selection method, critical
appraisal of bias in the studies, information on analysis that is also reproducible (Martinic,
Pieper, Glatt, & Puliak, 2019). These elements aligned to the general framework that were
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applied to this study of defining intelligence failure. Figure 1.2 provides a visual framework for
the systematic review that was conducted pertaining to intelligence failure.

Figure 1.2: Systematic Review Design for Intelligence Failure
Step 1: Research Question
The guiding research question was “what is intelligence failure”. Several sub-questions
were also relevant. Is there a common definition or components that make up an intelligence
failure? What are the explained categorical causes or themes underpinning intelligence failure?
Last, what indicators allow analysts to assess categories of intelligence failure?
The selected provided a foundation for examining intelligence failure. The questions of
themes and categories (dimensions) further enabled development of a conceptual framework that
visualized these dimensions through estimative analysis. A definition provided the overarching
basis for dimensions. The dimensions helped to create indicators that were relevant to
intelligence failure. The overall outcome of these questions produced a method for assessing the
complexity of intelligence failures.
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Step 2: Sources Searched
The sourcing strategy examined two databases and one search engine. Expanding source
origin venues helped avoid the possibility of potential biases like selection bias or publication
bias, which could have occurred with reliance on one specific source or search engine. The
databases searched consist of Google Scholar, JSTOR, and the Taylor and Francis database.
Nonetheless, the study consisted of a purposive sample. As such, the method of sampling limited
the ability to provide far-arching generalizations to the mass array of literature on intelligence
failure.
The first database examined was Taylor and Francis online database. This database
provided access to peer-reviewed academic journals that were applicable to the field of
intelligence studies. The database provided a critical baseline of articles that were focused within
the intelligence field. A search of “intelligence failure” resulted in over 993 results. Due to
constraints on time and a single-researcher concept, the search was refined to a search based on
the title including “intelligence failure” yields 29 results.
The second database examined was JSTOR. The database provided wide access to
primary sources, book chapters, and academic journals across 75 disciplines, which otherwise
may not be found within the Taylor & Francis database. This was particularly relevant pertaining
to book literature that may not be freely available on Google Scholar, or available through Taylor
and Francis. A search of “intelligence failure” yielded 1,348 results. When refined to a search of
“intelligence failure” for the title, or the abstract the search result yielded 40 results. No year
restriction was necessary for the database, which helped to mitigate chronological biases that
might have otherwise existed in the search.
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Lastly, the systematic review examined the search engine Google Scholar. Google
Scholar provided access to peer-reviewed articles and “gray literature” (Coulthart, 2017). It also
included dissertations. The wide expanse of information on google scholar allowed for a
comprehensive look into intelligence failure. Martín-Martín, Thelwall, Orduna-Malea, & LópezCózar, (2021) conducted an analysis of 3,073,351 citations. They found Google Scholar was the
most comprehensive source that found over 88% of the citations (Martín-Martín, et al., 2021).
Any search engine presents the danger of information overload. A Google Scholar search
of “intelligence failure” yielded 8,010 results. Given the limitations of number of researchers and
time constraints the search had to be further filtered down. The search criterion for the search
was limited to an advanced search of “intelligence failure” within the title. The refinement
yielded 287 results. A further refined search criterion included restricting publication years
between 2009-2020, which produced 140 results.
Step 3: Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria & Definitional Standards
As noted within the sources section the mass array of publications on the topic is
expansive. Inclusion criteria began with sources with “intelligence failure” within the title. The
source had to also have free access or UTEP available access to be included, which helped to
expedite processing. Each source was then searched starting with “intelligence failure
definition”, “intelligence failure is defined”, “definition”, “defined”, “intelligence failure”, and
“failure”. Consistency of search features adhered to objectivity of process, which is a guiding
principle to content analysis (Benoit, 2011). An initial examination aimed to identify if the
author defined intelligence failure individually, relied on an existing definition, or did not define
the term.
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An examination of individual definitions posits the challenge of what constitutes as a
suitable definition. While it was difficult to measure the value of a definition, it was possible to
set forth some criteria that allowed for inclusion or exclusion of definitions. Systematic reviews
are often used in the medical field, and on this basis a medical approach of diagnosis seemed
most appropriate for examining the diagnosis of intelligence failure. The analogy here provided
the underlying assumption that intelligence failure was an ailment, and the only way to properly
diagnose the ailment was to define it adequately enough.
A definition generally speaking here was defined as an explanation for what a term
means (Gupta, 2019). Various types of definitions exist and the methodological approach for
inclusion was left fairly loose, with some conditions. Definitions that were circular were still
included in the sample, but their value certainly did little for developing a working definition.
For example, an author could claim intelligence failure is an event that occurs when intelligence
fails. Circular definitions do little to get to the essence of a definition, but it was still worth
including in the sample given the examination because it might reflect a pattern.
An aspect the methodology considered to be null for consideration were ostensive
definitions. Ostensive definitions are rudimentary definitions based on example (Gupta, 2019).
There is much greater complexity to ostensive definitions, but as applied to the methodology this
would be best phrased as intelligence failure by example. The methodology examines
approaches these ostensive definitions narrowly. For example, if an author said, “an intelligence
failure is an event that occurs that was similar to Pearl Harbor or 9-11”. This does not
demonstrate a reasonable attempt at a definition aimed at explaining the phenomenon. Many
authors have written extensively on these cases and assessed many variables differently. There
seldom has been universal agreement found with any intelligence failure example.
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Moreover, if there was an explicit definition or a definition that the researcher could
reasonably conclude was clear, the source was included. Sources that were in the literature were
still included as part of the sample. The substance length of the definition was not used as the
basis for exclusion; the definition had to be broad enough to address the general concept. There
were case studies that only defined intelligence failure with respect to the case. These were
excluded if there was not broader attempt at definition more broadly. If no definition was
provided, the source was excluded. JSTOR and Google Scholar did have overlapping sources. As
such, overlapping sources were only be included only once and excluded from the sample count
from other databases.
McPherson, Arango, Fox, Lauver, McManus, Newacheck, Perrin, Shonkoff, &
Strickland, B. (1998) set six criteria they used to define children with special healthcare needs. A
condensed version of these principles relevant to the methodology focusing on intelligence
failure included: a definition that was simple and could be easily understood, have policy or
practitioner utility, recognize various linkages, be both specific and measurable (if possible), and
reflect current knowledge (McPherson et al., 1998).
There was the possibility that some authors may claim there is no such thing as
intelligence failure. Johnston (2005) found in his ethnographic study that some practitioners did
not believe intelligence failure existed. Explicit claims to this effect were included to the sample.
For example, an author may assert that intelligence failure is really something else, such as a
policy failure. It was important to open the realm of possibility that there was no common
definition possible of intelligence failure. Thus, the Lowenthal (2008) definition also would be
included.
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Step 4: Selection/Screening Method
The first column that was filled was the source information. This was standardized APA
format, which provided some verification of the title and the relevance of the source. As the
article was examined under selected search terms the definition (or claim no definition was
possible or exists) was copied and pasted verbatim. If no definition was provided than “no
definition” or “no explicit definition” was inputted into the fourth column, and no further
analysis was completed. If the definition was provided this led to a further analysis of the source
itself to identify examples used and attributes or causes that were explained by the source, in the
other columns.
The Table included the database, source, type of study (Qualitative, or Quantitative, e.g.,
QUANT, QUAL-Single-Case Study, QUAL-Multiple-Case Study, QUAL-Ethnographic,
QUAL-Theoretical), the definition, related themes/dimensions (i.e., Cognitive bias/COG,
organizational/ORG, policy/POL, or a mix between/MIX), number of citations, and a value
assessment which is discussed in the next section.
For example, an author who conducted a case study on intelligence failure X. The author
provided a definition meeting the inclusion criteria. Next, the number of citations used within the
paper and the number of times the source has been referenced was recorded. The source was
scanned to determine the type of study the author was doing. The study type was then recorded
into the table.
Also included within the table were specific intelligence failures that the author
referenced (i.e., 9-11, Pearl Harbor, Cuban Missile crisis etc.). These examples provided an
insightful guide to the breadth of events labeled as intelligence failure, but for the purposes of
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methodology they were not weighted. However, examples provided important insights for trends.
They also provided insight to why and how authors chose a given definition.
Table 1.1 Recording Template for Definitions and Source Assessment
Data Base or Search Engine
Source

Manuscript
Type

Research
Method

Definition
Category/Themes

Examples Referenced

Citations

Cited in Other Work

Value Assessed

The data collected systematically falls was inputted into Table 1.1. Presumably, sources
with greater rigor were counted on to provide definitions of stronger value, but also definitions
that may be better known within the field of intelligence studies. The following provided greater
detail on the inputs that are placed in columns.
Some sources across the databases and search engine included book reviews. These
reviews were still examined. A case-by-case basis was assessed when it came to obtaining the
books they referenced. As time allowed these books were also analyzed to see if they had a
definition. For example, the original sample of Taylor and Francis was n=29 but was increased to
n=30 because a book was included into the sample.
Potential error was mitigated through the screening process through consultation. As
results were obtained consultation with the project advisor provided important insights to further
assess the results, and external faculty were also consulted. Peers were also consulted pertaining
to their thoughts of particular definitions that were deemed to be in the “gray area” of being a
proper addition.
Step 5: Critical Appraisal of Studies
Given the studies were pulled through varying databases and a search engine, a critical
appraisal on research type was required. Such criteria remain largely subjective in nature, which
also tied to the issue of screening (Martinic, Pieper, Glatt, & Puliak, 2019). Most of the sources
15

used were peer-reviewed and met a suitable threshold for being sufficient for consideration.
Intelligence studies have a significant volume of qualitative research. Both quantitative and
qualitative research were equally valued depending on assessed rigor as shown in Table 1.2. It
was expected most sources were qualitative and explanatory.
Norman (2006) developed a Trust Scale and Website Evaluation Worksheet assessing
various aspects of sourcing and is particularly relevant to assessing Open-Source Intelligence
Analysis. The worksheet utilized a scale to assess sources that ranked credibility from low to
high. The sources applied to the scale are arguably already qualified to measure as “high
credibility sources”. Facets of the evaluation worksheet were synthesized into a new framework
that was narrower to the topic examined. The synthesis was necessary because the scale does not
delineate factored scores based on the type of research method. Moreover, the framework did not
delineate the number of times the source had been. While the worksheet has numbers, it was still
largely subjective.
The appraisal was based on the highest value a source reaches in two out of three areas of
appraisal. Since the focus was on definition, both primary and secondary sources were
applicable. A selected source that achieved two out of three high score thresholds gained a high
value. A selected source that had two out of three thresholds in the low value was assessed as
low value. All other sources were assessed as medium value. If a selected source qualified as
meeting requirements with one high, one medium, and one low then it earned a medium value
requirement. The following further elaborates on study type, dimensions, and citations.
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Table 1.2 Source Value Appraisal Assessment
Value

Study Type

Dimensions

High

May consist of
Quantitative studies or
Qualitative studies. The
latter consists of multiple
case studies (2 or more),
or ethnographies with a
sample size over 30.

Provides detail of
multi-dimensional
aspects or categories
that go into
intelligence failure.
(More than 2)

Medium

Low

Citations

Source contains
over 20 sources of
material
supporting, or the
source itself has
been cited over 10
times in other
work.
Qualitative→ detailed
Provides detail of
Source contains 5single case study
multi-dimensional
20 sources of
included.
aspect or categories
material supporting
that go into
claims, or the
intelligence failure (up source itself has
to 2 causal categories) been cited over 5
times in other
work.
Qualitative/Theoretical→ Does not detail
Source does not
No detailed case study or dimensional factors at contain significant
empirical analysis. This
length or asserts a
sourcing, or the
may also include
single cause.
source has not been
published articles from
cited in other work
practitioners that are
up to five times.
limited in scope due to
classification or focused
solely on first-person
experience. Book
reviews are also included
within this category.

The first aspect of appraisal was study type. Rigor was the focus on the appraisal. The use
of multiple case studies gained a higher appraisal than case studies. Empirical studies or mixed
method studies that maintained a large sample size were also assessed with a high appraisal.
Sources with multiple case studies or research ethnographies with a sample above n=30 were
considered to have higher value than single case studies. The sample size criteria undergirded the
assumption that the source was an academic journal or dissertation. The appraisal also examined
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the number of sources used within a given study as a measure of rigor. Furthermore, number of
times the source was cited was also considered as a basis for critical appraisal (Table 1.2).
The second aspect of the appraisal was dimensional categories. The use of dimensional
mitigated too narrow of a focus centering just to causes or attributes. Both of these concepts
tended to bleed over and were not mutually exclusive. Given the significant number of sources
relied on qualitative research, it was difficult to assess clear causes as a broader generalization.
Delineating causes and attributes became difficult due to the fact they tended to overlap.
Dimensions broadened the scope to mitigate this limitation, by creating an umbrella term.
However, this study was unable to answer where the line between causes or attributes starts or
ends.
Some authors inevitably focused on one dimension more than others. It is understood
some of these dimensions had overlaps and greater complexity. Cognitive errors may have
disrupted both analysts and policymakers alike. Groupthink represented a cognitive failing but
has organizational overlaps. The literature review attempted to organize these dimensions, but
the reality remains that overlap occurred. The coding process of dimensions included search
terms of “cause” and “attribute”. The search included phrases like “because”, “caused”, and
“attributed”. A further examination of headings could shed light on the dimensions the author
felt were relevant. Benoit (2011) explained a clear and transparent method for coding is required,
and themes may be derived from what was previously known. Inter-rater reliability permeated as
a limitation. Therefore, the following explains the coding procedure and what specific qualitative
categories entail.
One example dimension would be attributions that were policy based (Coded: Pol)
intelligence failure. This code included politicization or the claim a policymaker inappropriately
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or inadvertently interfered with the intelligence process (Lowenthal, 2017). It may be attributed
to direct or indirect pressuring of policymakers to obtain a certain result, or it could be the
attempt of intelligence officials to shape their own policy preferences (Lowenthal, 2017). Policy
also included established laws that may have prevented a particular mitigating action from
happening or prevented organizations from operating together.
Another dimension would be organizational themes (Coded: Org). This code included
attributes like organizational culture, organizational structure, or organizational leadership
deficiencies within the organization that contributed to an intelligence failure. Zegart (2009)
focused particular attention to organizational fragmentation and adaptation failure that were
some of the issues that led to 9-11. Olson (2019) provides similar insight to the troubling
organizational cultures that plagued U.S. counterintelligence.
A final dimension highlighted was cognitive (Coded: Cog). The causes may be rooted in
psychological causes of comprehending or understanding information due to biases, or flawed
assumptions that were never reassessed. Like any professional group analysts and operators
might have particular biases that contribute to an intelligence failure. After all, intelligence
professionals operate within a world where they have only some puzzle pieces of an incomplete
puzzle set. As such, assumptions may be wrong.
The appraisal of these dimensions adheres to the argument of Gill & Phythian (2018) that
failures are multi-causal. As such, including more dimensions led to a higher appraisal. Two
dimensions met a moderate standard and mentioning only one constituted a low standard. For
example, an author may highlight how politicization, organizational culture, and cognitive
problems (e.g., coded as Mix: Pol, Org, Cog) played an important role in intelligence failure.
However, that author may focus more of their effort on the cognitive cause of a given failure. In
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cases where one particular attribute or cause was repeatedly focused on over others an asterisk
(*) was included to denote special emphasis by the author. Thus, the coding here would be
denoted as Mix: Pol, Org, Cog*. No adjustment to value had been applied to these cases. The
asterisk served to highlight patterns where authors placed greater emphasis.
Intelligence failure often constitutes a diluted multi-layered and multi-faceted
phenomenon (Figure 1.3). Determining actual causation becomes difficult. This was part of the
reason why this topic may be written about often. The overlap of political science, psychology,
philosophy/ethics, organizational leadership, and military history highlighted just a few of the
multiple overlaps that occur in the complex appraisal of such a topic.

Figure 1.3: The Multitude of Dimensions
Another aspect of appraisal examined citations used within the source as well as the
number of times the source has been cited in other work. Over 20 citations within the source met
sufficient rigor to rank high based on this appraisal. Above 5 but less than 20 met a moderate
qualification, and anything less qualified for a low value. However, a balance was considered
20

because mainstream journals such as Foreign Policy or others may not have significant citations
that can be examined. As such Google Scholar was used to cross reference how many times a
selected source was cited in other work. Thus, a source that was cited over 10 times achieved a
high appraisal. Being cited 5-9 times achieved a moderate appraisal, and less would be a low
appraisal. Deference was given to the source for the highest score of these.
Finally, the definitions were evaluated. This evaluation helped derive the development of
a working definition that can contribute to future research. The condensed standards outlined by
McPherson et al., 1998) were applied as part of the discussion. However, this assessment was not
used relating to the assessed ranking of the source. Weighting definitional values was avoided
because of the concern this might interject to much potential bias at the outset. Greater emphasis
was placed on the source rigor versus just the definition. As such, the discussion provides an
outlet to broadly discuss the definitional findings and what patterns they showed.
Step 6: Information on Analysis Reproducible.
Through clear search criteria and development of graphical depictions of information
afforded a clear and transparent means to reproduce information and analysis. In order to avoid
definitional confusion, the definitions were copied verbatim into Table 1.1. The biggest risk for
replicability related to coding of dimensions. This danger existed because this was mostly done
manually, and open to single-coder interpretation. Creswell and Creswell (2018) explained that
thick descriptions created the elements of shared experience that enhanced validity. The danger
of assessing inflexible categories was that it could take away from emerging themes. Therefore, a
priori categories were found in the literature review, but expanding categories were also
considered.
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Literature Review
A Google Scholar search of “Intelligence Failure” yields over 8,010 results. A search of
“Policy Failure” yields 40,700 results. This represents a significant difference in yield, and yet
seemingly intelligence failure consumes enormous amounts of headline space and opinion
columns. For example, an analysis using the same search in The New York Times for intelligence
failure yields 388 results. Ironically in a twist a search of policy failure in The New York Times
results with only 279 results.
While intelligence failure does not outnumber policy failure in broader academic
research, there is a great deal of literature concerning its causes and attributes. Generally
speaking, the definition of intelligence failure remains as illusive and scattered as the definition
of intelligence itself (Gill & Phythian, 2018; Lowenthal, 2017). Lowenthal (2017) explains
intelligence is different from other governmental functions because what goes on is secret, and
these secrets are a source of controversy.
What is Intelligence?
In order to understand intelligence failure, it is important to define what intelligence is.
One cannot assert a failure without having a generally agreed upon concept of what failed. Even
in this case the study of intelligence has mixed conceptions. Is intelligence a process,
information, a system, or simply and institutional structure for gathering information? Lowenthal
(2017) provides one such definition amid the squabble.
“Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of
policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those
needs.” (Lowenthal, 2017, p.2)
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Other frameworks exist for defining intelligence as well. Knorr (1964b) explains
intelligence as an operation that procures and processes information about an external
environment, for the purpose of the government to achieve various goals. The world of
intelligence operates both within and without the realms of the complicated interagency
processes.
Gill & Phythian (2018) and Prunckun (2015) both explore the role of the intelligence
cycle as it relates to intelligence. While the early models of this process provide explanatory
value, they miss many of the complexities and tangled webs that make the intelligence cycle
(Gill & Phythian, 2018). The process may be depicted as a circular practice, but it has many
tangled webs at various points. This factor is important because approaching intelligence failure
from a process point of view can run the risk of attribution error. Namely, there is the possibility
of blaming the wrong link. They cycle steps include planning/direction setting, information and
data collection, processing, data analysis, and reporting and disseminating to policymakers
(Prunckun, 2015; Gill & Phythian, 2018).
One important component that is widely acknowledged relating to this cycle is the
policymaker has a vote (figuratively and literally), and this input can come at any step within the
cycle. Lowenthal (2017) draws a figure that expresses the intelligence-policy nexus where
intelligence activities are walled off from interfering with policy, but policy makers are able to
penetrate the metaphorical intelligence cellular membrane. A general conceptualization of how
the intelligence cycle functions shows a very complex process, and while the conceptualization is
not as detailed as Gill & Phythian’s (2018) model it does encapsulate a process ecosystem
(Figure 2.1). Process appears time and again during discussions of intelligence failure with a
tendency towards terms like “information sharing” and “interoperability”.
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The area surrounding emphasizes the non-linear reality. As the diversity of actors
increase, so does the uncertainty. The process internally demonstrates that there are multiple
interactions that impact the process, and these interactions go both ways. The dark arrows
originating from analysis highlight that analysis may (and should) interact across the process
with decision makers and collectors. Dashed lines constitute uncertainty of information flow, and
this may vary internally or externally depending on processes. The orange arrows denote the
standard process, but they were modified to reflect they function back and forth.

Figure 2.1: The Complex Intelligence Cycle Ecosystem
Prunckun (2015) defines intelligence uniquely through an equation. This definition
focuses on the probabilistic/estimative role of intelligence. The equation used is, “(secrecy
(information + analysis = intelligence ∴ insight→ reduces uncertainty))” (Prunckun, 2015, p.6).
This definition highlights the critical role that unlike other forms of research, intelligence relies
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in a world of secrecy. Intelligence relies on probability, and this is why, “it is better—and more
accurate—to think of intelligence as proximate reality” (Lowenthal, 2017, p.8).
Intelligence Failure & the Attributes of Intelligence Failure
Gill & Phythian (2018) note that applying the term failure reflects a judgement, but the
threshold of success versus failure is unclear. The result of this lack of clarity is that accusations
of intelligence failure are rooted in flawed expectations, which lead to misdirected policies to
reform intelligence “failures” (Gentry, 2008). Part of this is rooted in the uncertainties inherent to
having limited information. Knorr (1964a) provides a realist assessment that the aim of
intelligence is to improve the “batting average”. This does not suggest surprise is inevitable, but
the aim should be to mitigate it. This is because intelligence predictions are future-based, and
therefore subject to probabilities of success (Knorr, 1964b).
One way to analyze intelligence failure is to try to answer the question of what is the aim
of intelligence in the first place? According to Lowenthal (2017) the aim of intelligence agencies
is to avoid/prevent strategic surprise, provide long-term knowledge, support policy processes,
and maintain proper secrecy. Presumably, any definition of intelligence failure would reflect a
failure in one or more of these purposes. However, the picture is much more complicated in the
literature.
Erik Dahl elaborates on three schools of intelligence failure, in his book Intelligence and
surprise attack: Failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. His breakdown of
these schools reflects many of the main themes found within the literature review. Dahl (2013)
labels these schools of thought as traditionalist, reformist, and contrarian.
First, the traditionalist school aligns to a more fatalistic and pessimistic view of
intelligence failure. It generally ascribes intelligence failures are inevitable and the circumstance
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of cognitive challenges of analysis amid uncertain information (Dahl, 2013). The locus of blame
with this school exists more at the hands of human nature than at the fault of intelligence
organizations. Second, the reformist school demonstrates more optimism and focuses on how
organizational information sharing and mitigating bureaucratic hurdles (Dahl, 2013). Here the
locus of fault centers on organizations and processes, while limiting the blame on analysts or
collectors. Last, the contrarian school places the fault of intelligence failure at the hands of faulty
collection and opposes the previous claims of fault being centered on organization or analysis
(Dahl, 2013).
Slippery Slides of Strategic Surprise
The first major assessment of intelligence failure was encapsulated in Robin
Wohlstetter’s book Pearl Harbor: warning and decision, which was published in 1962. Pearl
Harbor was an awakening for the need of better intelligence to anticipate surprise. Wohlstetter
(1962) primarily attributes this intelligence failure to a cumulative failure within the existing
intelligence apparatus to discern the sound and noise dilemma infused through Japanese denial
and deception, in December 1941 (Wohlstetter, 1962). What leads to specific elements of
surprise may vary from sound and noise to human cognitive errors (Wohlstetter, 1962). Bruce
and Bennett (2014) elaborate on the sound and noise dilemma. Deception, they argue, is a factor
in many intelligence failures. However, the use of denial is a factor in all intelligence failures
(Bruce & Bennett, 2014).
Presumably, the successful countering of denial and deception holds the answer to
avoiding both tactical and strategic surprise, like those encountered by Pearl Harbor. Yet this
would be to assume intelligence or military capability would still be able to avoid the
consequence, or that policymakers would have acted. Dahl (2013) highlights the limitations
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posed through hindsight bias. This also hints at another bias pertaining to strategic surprise. BarJoseph & McDermott (2017) correctly identify that strategic surprise is not only negative. Can
there be positive strategic surprises? For example, cases of positive strategic surprise include the
collapse of the Soviet Union, or Anwar Sadat’s unexpected push for peace with the Israelis, in
1977 (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017).
Another element of value is the role of error. Errors have the inherent ability to cause
surprise. At the tactical level this may be necessary, but not sufficient. When dealing with
strategic surprise the error needs to expand beyond individual analysts, into an organizational or
policy adoption that creates a cumulative error. Very few (if any) ‘intelligence failures’ can ever
be traced to one analyst in a cubicle, or one operative in the field. James Bond may be
entertaining, but it is Hollywood. Johnston (2005) conducted an ethnographic study where he
derived the following definitions of intelligence error and intelligence failure.
“Intelligence errors are factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or
missing data; intelligence failure is systemic organizational surprise resulting
from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses.” (Johnston, 2005,
p.4)
Responding to denial and deception requires an adaption to the external environment.
This adaption failure is conceptualized as change, magnitude of change, and improved fit to
respond to the external environment’s conditions (Zegart, 2007). Using adaptation failure
provides another conceptualization for assessing intelligence failure. Presumably, an
organization that fails to adapt to the threat will inevitably be surprised. Zegart (2007) argues that
the Intelligence Community was unable to adapt to the emergent threat. Through empirical
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analysis found the IC only implemented 35/340 recommendations that were identified by 12
commission and think tank studies from 1991 to 2001 (Zegart, 2007).
However, while surprise may be necessary it is not always sufficient or even necessarily
bad. Denn and Ryan (2018) provide another facet to consider relating to their claim that North
Korean weapons development was not an instance of intelligence failure. Their definition is
rooted in the claim that intelligence failures share negligence, and significant consequences
(Denn & Ryan, 2018). Negligence entails omissions or getting intelligence substantially wrong,
which resulted in significant consequences (Denn & Ryan, 2018).
Another simplified definition of intelligence failure focuses on the elemental basis of the
role of prediction. One such definition claims, “Intelligence failure is a mismatch between
estimates and what later information reveals” (Jervis, 2010, p.2). While this is incredibly simple,
there is plenty of ambiguity that surrounds the concept of intelligence failure. Jervis (2010)
explains the orientation on major surprise intelligence failures narrows the scope because of the
traumatic image value, but this rhetorical focus on surprise ignores an expansive arena of other
potential intelligence failures (Jervis, 2010).
On the other hand, Lowenthal (2008) argues that intelligence failure is defined by failing
to adequately explain the role of intelligence and its limitations to the public. Denn & Ryan
(2018) explain misperception of intelligence capabilities creates a false view that intelligence
agencies are omniscient. These views are prevalent across the literature. The result of faulty
views of intelligence capability is vilification from the public and policymakers. This is an
assessment that is hard to refute, especially with the luxury of hindsight bias. The result is
blaming intelligence for any surprise (Gentry, 2008). This aligns to a realistic conclusion that
intelligence is a necessary but not sufficient for achieving success or victory (Keegan, 2003).
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The literature pertaining to intelligence failure largely focuses on case studies (Betts,
2014). However, amid a plethora of case study examples there appears to be a lack of clear and
broad definitions of intelligence failure, or a widely accepted definition based on an initial
review of literature. Dahl’s (2013) delineation of schools of thought may help explain this divide,
and more importantly argue for also focusing on intelligence successes, in the literature. The
discrepancies between schools demonstrate the diverse attributions for sourcing the cause of
failure at particular points, while ignoring others. Given the fact intelligence is a process there
can be a temptation of attributing an intelligence failure or intelligence error to a single point
such as collection or analysis (Gill & Phythian, 2018).
Gill & Phythian (2018) demonstrate in the cases of 9-11 or Iraq WMDs that intelligence
failures tend to be multi-causal as opposed to mono causal. Various variables can be present at
one point, or many points of intelligence failures. Such variables include policy failure,
organizational/structure culture, and cognitive analysis failures (Gentry, 2008). The vast research
tends to be focused within the explanatory methods of qualitative research, but with an everchanging definition.
A generalized approach to visualizing the problem set also reaffirms a great deal of the
literature reviewed. Policy, Organizational, and Cognitive failures provide common themes that
are found to varying degrees across intelligence-related literature. These can also be examined
from the lens of strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic intelligence describes a broad longterm focused intelligence relevant to senior decision makers, which aligns to the trends of policy
focus (Dahl, 2013). As defined by this research, operational intelligence focuses on specific
regions or specified operations pertinent to the organizations involved, and so it fits more
organizational overseeing the handling of operations. This area is less defined, and Dahl (2013)
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did not define operational intelligence at all. Tactical intelligence entails shorter-term items
normally known to lower levels in the hierarchy (Dahl, 2013). Here it makes sense to examine
more closely at the individual analyst or team level. Prior to delving into these facets in detail
Figure 2.2 provides a conceptual synopsis of the themes and concepts often described further in
the literature.

Figure 2.2: Conceptualization of Dimensions Related Intelligence Failure
Figure 2.2 provides one means to summarize the gerneral concept of literature. Common
phrases are included into the all encompassing background such as “failure to imagine”, grave
consequences, politicization, and denial and deception. This only identifies a few, and is not
exhaustive. The arrow lines demonstrate the broad themes that many authors tend to focus on.
These arrows are elaborated on with subsequent subsections. While these arrows may be
separate, this does not mean there is not overlap. Many complex events have numerous overlaps
to varying degrees.
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Intelligence and Policy
Following the inception of a central intelligence apparatus, there has been a recurring
practice of excusing policy failures through identifying weaknesses in the IC (Fingar, 2017).
The Director of Central Intelligence was a critical aspect of the National Security Act of 1947,
and yet through decades the director was tasked with overseeing the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and intelligence community. The latter of which, the director had limited authority over
(George, 2017). However, all of this was ineffectually supported by policy that did not give the
director budgetary oversight of all intelligence agencies as they expanded or necessary
authorities to direct them (Zegart, 2007). This reflects the difficult interagency turf wars and
politics that have continued to pervade intelligence. The inherent fragmentation of the policy
process makes it difficult to achieve organizational reforms (Zegart, 2007).
Along this line the challenge of fragmentation exists both within the Executive and
Legislative branches of government. The Executive consists of competing agencies that often
have overlapping interests and responsibilities. Just within the IC agencies exist in numerous
cabinet departments and have particular focuses that enable their respective departments. This
often results in turf wars, of which the IC is a part. On the other hand, the role of Congressional
oversight is matched with a complex committee system and electoral interests among members
to their constituents that can hamper major reform efforts (Auerswald & Campbell, 2017).
For this reason, intelligence reforms aimed to correct deficiencies in the 1992 and 1996
fell flat in Congress, and lacked executive support (Zegart, 2007). These reforms were only later
acted on following 9-11. The Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the
Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
as a remedy for the deficiencies of the Intelligence Community (Fingar, 2017; Hedley, 2014).

31

The first set of literature generally leaned toward aligning intelligence failures to being
rooted to issues of policy or politicization. Gentry (2008) conceptualized intelligence failure
using a warning perspective to evaluate the causes of state intelligence failure. While attribution
for warning failures is attributed to intelligence agencies, this is distinguishable from other forms
of failure. Intelligence failure is defined here as:
Intelligence fails if a state does not adequately collect and interpret intelligence
information, make sound policy based on the intelligence (and other factors), and
effectively act. (Gentry, 2008, p.248)
Gentry (2008) divided intelligence failure into six sub-failure groupings that vary in
terms of responsible entities. This element could be the intelligence agencies responsible,
specific to policy makers, or applicable to both categories. The types and characteristics are
featured in Table 2.1, were drawn directly from Gentry (2008).
Table 2.1 Intelligence Related Failure Types (Gentry, 2008, p.249)
Type

Name

Characteristic

1

Threat Warning

“Threat Warning Failure by Intelligence Agencies”

2

Threat Response

3

Opportunity Warning

4

Opportunity Response

“Leaders’ failure to respond effectively to threat
warnings, by policy or executive action”
“Failure by intelligence agencies to alert policy makers
of opportunities to exploit”
“Leaders’ failure to effectively exploit vulnerabilities”

5

Vulnerability Identification

6

Vulnerability Amelioration

“Failure to recognize one’s own vulnerabilities in the
context of other actors’ intentions and capabilities”
“Failure to ameliorate one’s own capabilities”

Varying types of failure can be interconnected and reinforce one another, because the
relationship is reciprocal (Betts, 2007). Gentry (2008) attributed intelligence agencies to Type 1
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and Type 3 failures, while policy makers are attributed to Type 2 and Type 4 failures. Type 5 and
Type 6 failures were seen as analytically distinct from the others were attributed to adaptive
threats (Gentry, 2008). This framework places a greater share of responsibility towards the
policy maker (Gentry, 2008). Most well-known cases of intelligence failure are more often
political rather than organizational (Betts, 2014). This is because consumers of intelligence have
policy assumptions that restrain open perception to the products they are given (Betts, 2014).
While this may not always be the case there is a great deal of intelligence studies literature that
focuses on the role of politicization of intelligence.
The case of Iraq WMDs has continued to be one of the most cited examples of failure
often popularly attributed to intelligence, but often within the context of intelligence-policy
failure. Pillar (2012) provided a first-person perspective that claimed intelligence did not play a
role with invading Iraq. This account asserted the IC had not believe Iraq was allied to Al-Qaeda,
and that it was not believed Saddam would use WMDs unless he was invaded (Pillar, 2012). This
led many to the deduction that intelligence was likely politicized in some fashion to push a
specific policy preference. The WMD case presented further complexity given there was also
distinction of strategic and tactical intelligence failure. Tracing politicization in these respects
presents many more pieces to fit. Strategic intelligence is focused on long-terms threats, whereas
tactical intelligence is near-term focused. Pillar (2012) claimed 9-11 reflected a tactical
intelligence failure given it was a specific terrorist attack. From a strategic level, the IC
acknowledged the likelihood of emergent terrorist threats throughout the 1990s (Pillar, 2012:
Zegart, 2007).
Rovner (2011) explained the functional use of politicizing intelligence. The means of
politicization could be direct or indirect. Direct politicization involves direct leader intervention
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to have an analytic conclusion changed, while indirect politicization entails tacit signaling such
as cherry picking or begging the question (Rovner, 2011). The oversell model contends
politicization is likely to occur if leaders make public commitments, and if there is a critical
constituency that gives incentive to make intelligence support a policy (Rovner, 2011).
An important aspect of politicization entails proximity. Rovner (2011) claims personal
proximity to policymakers, organizational proximity to policy process, and loss of organizational
dependence through perverse incentives can lead to politicization. All of these aspects are
reflected in varying case studies (Rovner, 2011). However, a complete disconnect within the
intelligence-policy interface can lead to other distinct issues. The only method to avoid the risk
of politicization is to remove intelligence out of informing decision makers (Betts, 2007). This
reflects the sober reality that there are enormous limitations on reforming intelligence drastically.
The paradox arises that intelligence is vulnerable to politicization, but policy is blind without
intelligence-policy interface.
The ‘oversell model’ posited by Rovner (2011) provided an important basis for
understanding some of the causal factors of politicization. However, there is plenty of literature
on intelligence failure that suggests there are other causes to intelligence failure, beyond the
troubled relations of intelligence and policy. Jervis (2010) provides a caveat on the
methodological issue of causal examination because it searches off of the dependent variable as
it relates to failure. Afterall, it is still possible for a perceived success to devolve into a perceived
failure as the political landscape changes over time.
Organizational Culture & Fragmentation
The second area of examination of intelligence failure pertains to organizational culture,
structure, and fragmentation. While these cannot be completely separated from policy, they are
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still distinct. Common issues of stove piping (lack of information sharing) and bureaucratic turf
wars are prominent in explanations relating to the failures leading up to 9-11, in particular. These
phenomena reflect both the cultural and institutional burdens that can also harm the chances of
intelligence success.
Zegart (2007) defined organizational culture as ideas, values, and beliefs that shaped the
views of its members. The CIA has been marked by a distinct culture and subculture. Cogan
(1993) examined the divide between analysts and operators within the CIA. Analysts were
described as favoring the Sherman Kent professional ethics of objectivity and intellectual
integrity, while operations officers favored secrecy through safeguarding knowledge as power
(George, 2017). This divide provides some insight to the role sub-cultures play within an
organization, and the result of stove-piping. This reflects the micro-elements of stove-piping.
The mix of culture feeds fragmentation and this may also happen vice versa.
Gentry (2017) examined the role of fear playing a role in intelligence failures. He
attributed a culture of fear that had external causes that included politicization and bureaucratic
greed. Other fears consisted of personal and organizational fears. This illuminates a
psychological and cognitive dynamic that also may contribute to an intelligence failure. The role
of cumulative fears may shed light to explain the causes of recent intelligence failures (Gentry,
2017).
An added perspective of culture and structure entailed deficiencies of structure, cultural
pathologies, and wrong incentives. First, Zegart (2007) examined various attempts at reforms
and finds that fragmentation in the CIA was a significant deficiency from the outset. The split of
domestic and foreign intelligence reflected this fragmentation from a policy level. However,
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internal fragmentation took root in the form of field offices gaining primacy that focused only on
their specific regions (Zegart, 2007).
Second, the realm of cultural pathologies of the IC has been well documented. The
general pattern of parochialism and “need to know” sharing has long plagued the relationship
between the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Olson, 2019). This divide
originated back to the bureaucratic infighting of 1947, itself in part based in fragmentation of
domestic versus foreign intelligence. The outcome of these pathologies has been at the cost of
information sharing and culminating in the disaster of 9-11. The 9-11 Commission found that
there was a failure of information sharing between both the IC and Law Enforcement (Fingar,
2017). An additional aspect attributed to 9-11 was risk aversion and ‘failure of imagination’
(Hedley, 2014).
Part of the FBI, IC, and Department of Defense (DoD) turf wars were rooted in unique
cultures as much as from the policy origins. This creates a “chicken or the egg” dilemma. This
applies both to intelligence and counterintelligence. Differing missions, authorizations, and
personalities result in turf wars between agencies seeking to actualize their identity (Olson, 2019;
George & Rishikof, 2017). In this sense, while policy may create cultural divisions this may not
mean that policy changes can overcome ingrained cultures that have been solidified over
decades.
Third, the issue of perverse incentives also plays a role in intelligence failure. Zegart
(2007) highlights how quantity over quality incentives to analysts, is also supplemented with
rewards focused on near-term fires over long-term strategy. Critique of narrowed focus on near
term objectives pervades the literature and extends to other departments such as the State

36

Department. All of these factors in turn helped to contribute to the CIA’s inability to adapt to the
emerging terrorist threat prior to 9-11 (Zegart, 2007).
Nolan (2013) expanded on this research through an ethnographic study of the CIA and
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Through a series of 20 interviews, she found the
barrier between agencies was cultural versus structural (Nolan, 2013). While the sample here
was low, it does provide detailed insights and patterns that relate to difficulties of information
sharing. Information sharing continues to be the all-encompassing indictment in many
intelligence failures. However, there is much greater complexity to information sharing beyond
the pleasantness of the term. Modern cases like Wikileaks show the potential dangers of too
much information sharing. Private Chelsea Manning enjoyed broad access to intelligence
systems that provided the plethora of the information that was leaked.
The definition of “greedy institutions” emerged as another facet that helped explain
both culture and fragmentation. Nolan (2013) defined a “greedy institution” as an institution
where culture was rooted on undivided loyalty and separation of others. Structural fragmentation
can also function to cement this culture. The nature of classifications and handling of secrets
infused a reinforcing effect of organizational domination, shared identification, commitment
through oaths, and integration into the organization (Nolan, 2013).
Other scholars have expanded on the role and complexity of bureaucratic politics and a
multitude of actors. The national security enterprise comprises one facet that helps to explain this
complexity of interagency organizational interaction. George and Rishikof (2017) defined this
interagency paradigm as one that extended beyond formal institutions and included informal
players. These players range from think-tanks, the expanding media, and special interest groups.
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Intelligence failures relating to leaks show that the media can also play a role in creating
surprises that can result in failure or compromise.
Cognitive Failures
A significant amount of literature within intelligence studies pertains to the danger of
cognitive biases. While cognitive biases are often tied to analysts, the reality is much more
complex. All consumers and producers of intelligence are subject to potential biases. This also
may extend to organizational biases influencing individual biases, or vice versa. Biases can thus
facilitate unexpected surprises. Davis (2016) examined various biases, and he emphasized
intelligence analysis was both a mental and social process. These apply to individual and group
dynamics at play. He defined “bad things” that occur to analysts as widely publicized
intelligence failures and major analytical errors that undermined good analysts (Davis, 2016).
Bias can come in motivated and unmotivated forms. The former entails distortions driven
by world view, while the latter entails those biases that are a distortion of information processing
(Davis, 2014). The Pearl Harbor intelligence failure might have represented unmotivated biases.
The Japanese use of denial and deception had a psychological effect through the mix of sound
and noise (Wohlstetter, 1962). A case study of the Yom Kippur War further expanded the
literature on the issue of bias and analysis. Israelis believed an Arab attack was contingent on
Egypt rebuilding its Air Force, which became a source of mirror imaging their own logic to the
enemy (Davis, 2014). Three previous false alerts of attacks cemented a confirmation bias that
there would not be an attack (Shlaim, 1976). A commission found two particular significant
failings leading up to the Yom Kippur War. A major source of attribution entailed a strict
adherence to “the conception”, and the resulting plethora of information from other agencies that
was not acted on (Shlaim, 1976).
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Psychological factors and institutional factors were both at play. “The conception” was
an ingrained institutional belief that Egypt would not attack unless it had aerial deep strike
capability (Shlaim, 1976). The acquisition of Soviet missiles for air defense was not considered.
The result of the mind-set failed to address the surprise rooted in changes to leadership or set
conditions (Shlaim, 1976). This case demonstrates how institutional belief can shape
psychological mind-set, and vice versa. Both concepts were reinforcing one another, which led to
surprise.
A case study of the Cuban Missile crisis further affirmed the role cognitive dimensions
can have with regard to intelligence failure. The Soviet Union enacted a policy of build-up in
Cuba that appeared in conflict with U.S. expectations, but this turned out to be not the case
(Knorr, 1964a). This dimension helps to understand some of the cognitive limitations that
formulate mirror imaging. The role of “national images” regarding attitudes extended to this bias
of mirror imaging (Knorr, 1964a).
Some have tried to mitigate the role that cognitive biases. Wohlstetter (1962) proposed
that the only way to attain sound over noise was to test hypotheses. Structural analytical
techniques were another method meant to challenge and correct faulty lines of logic presented in
intelligence failures, and are mandated through ICD 203 (Coulthart, 2017). However, the
multitude of variables across other dimensions like policy and organizational dynamics
demonstrate many facets fall under intelligence failure. As a result, many gaps among variables
exist.
Gaps in Literature
There are two critical gaps in current literature pertaining to intelligence failures in the
United States. The lack of a common accepted definition of intelligence failure and a lack of
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application beyond the IC both present gaps. Without a common definitional framework or
conceptual framework, the discourse of intelligence failure has amounted to a repetitive circular
firing squad of finger pointing. The result is a repetitive Groundhog Day seems to await the next
case of intelligence failure.
This literature review showed the definition of intelligence failure was wide and
complex. There was no common definition discovered to this point that pervades across
academia, although there are some common themes. The role of surprise and consequence
generally extended to policy, organizational, and cognitive causes linked to intelligence failure.
The common facet of most cases was that they involved surprise, but they were unique within
their own context (Johnston, 2005).
However, this logic negated a critical reverse possibility. Can intelligence failure occur
without surprise? An extensive history of failed covert actions suggests that surprise may not be
the defining element. Is it possible for flawed leadership ethics that are known and yet carried
out anyway another theme to consider? What about positive cases of strategic surprise, such as
the collapse of the Soviet Union? Dahl (2013) emphasizes the importance of examining both
intelligence failure and intelligence success, which is seldom done.
Over the course of 20 years, intelligence has exponentially expanded into domains of law
enforcement and private sector domains. However, with this growth there has been little analysis
or case study research related to intelligence failures or successes. Most research centered on the
CIA and military intelligence capacities. Law enforcement and Business have largely been
excluded from the discussion of intelligence failure. Research needs to keep pace with change.
For example, The FBI received little scrutiny in terms of their use of intelligence methods
extending beyond counterintelligence, or their National Security Division. As law enforcement
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has come under sustained political scrutiny for reform, it would add to the body of research to
examine intelligence failure and success beyond the confines of Langley. An expanded
examination of the FBIs ‘successful’ operation of HUMINT, which took down La Cosa Nostra
(LCN) could provide important insights that have largely been glossed over with the focus on
counterterrorism. For this reason, there is added value with aiming to develop a better working
understanding on intelligence failure that extends beyond the traditional focuses.
Another shifting area often ignored has been within the field of business intelligence. The
more recent hacks of Microsoft, theft of intellectual property, and the reality of corporate
espionage demonstrate that this area also merits greater attention from the academic community.
The academic community has not been immune from cases involving espionage on the part of
academic researchers. Increased overlapping partnerships between the private and public sector
have shown the need to examine variables that can lead to potential intelligence failures. These
are all areas that are worth closer examination.
An unaddressed gap that this research tries to address relates to aggregating existing
research systematically. This systematic review seeks to start bridging the gaps of historical
literature to present day practice. A definition focused systematic review constitutes a unique
contribution to the field of intelligence studies. Intelligence studies has struggled to evaluate
literature cumulatively (Marrin, 2016). This research aims to develop the building block towards
more expanded efforts of a broader systematic review that can effectively build bridges to
evaluate the puzzled discourse of intelligence failure.
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Systematic Review Results
The results of the systematic review provide a glimpse of some of the issues plaguing the
studies of intelligence failure. The first glaring observation was there was not a unified
definition. Definitions across the sample were diverse and did not reflect a common definition.
The second observation of the findings demonstrated the while the term intelligence failure was
used frequently, but many sources did not define the term. Another observation to account was
that only one author took the explicit position that there was no way to define intelligence
failure, or the concept was a misnomer.
The results are divided into several subsections. The first section addresses the aggregate
of data. The following sections further detail the results based on Taylor & Francis, JSTOR, and
Google Scholar. This provides a basis to further examine unique facets in the results such as
common themes and intelligence failures referenced. Areas explored in these subsections include
the results of study type, the definition results themselves, causes or attributes that were given,
examples of intelligence failure, and the general trend on citations. Overall, these provide a
holistic picture of the results that were obtained. They also provide a basis for the discussion
elaborating the puzzle that exists.
General Results
The examination of the search yielded over 210 total results. A total of n=33 sources
yielded a definition or conceptualization of intelligence failure. Over n=177 sources were
excluded for a wide range of reasons. Some of these exclusions were immediately determined
where the source was not easily accessible (i.e., cases of citations on Google Scholar), if there
was a repeat from a previous sample, no translation was available through other searches, or if
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the article was not relevant to intelligence failure. The latter case occurred on Google Scholar,
despite narrowed search criteria (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Systematic Review Aggregate Sample Breakdown
Systematic Review Results
Inclusion

Source
Taylor & Francis
JSTOR
Google Scholar
Total
Inclusion Sample Total
Exclusion Total

Definition No feasible
Provided definition
12
6
14
32

Exclusion
No
Sample Sample
No Definition
Translation Repeat Repeat Citation Not
provided
Not Relevant Possible
(T&F)
(JSTOR) s (N/A) Accessible
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
28
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
35
3
0
18
5
43
22
1
81
3
4
19
5
43
22

Total
30
40
140
210

33
177

The aggregated search included n=33 sources. No definition was provided in n=81 of the
sources. In other words, less than half of these sources even made the attempt to define
intelligence failure broadly. The lack of definition tended to be tied to case study approaches.
Qualitative case studies dominated across the sample. Another relevant area of findings was the
breakdown of appraisal based on the included sample. This appraisal was broken down by the
two databases and the search engine (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Aggregate Source Appraisal

Source
Taylor & Francis
JSTOR
Google Scholar
Total

Appraisal Evaluation
High
Moderate
12
6
9
27

0
0
5
5

Low

Total

0
1
0
1

12
7
14
33

The overall inclusion rate of definitions resulted in n=27 being assessed as high value.
Only five were assessed as moderate and one was assessed as low. Generally speaking, these
sources were all relatively well sourced and addressed multiple dimensions related to intelligence
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failure. As later results revealed there were some significant differences among definitions.
Copeland (2010) was the only source from Google Scholar was limited access. This access
limited assessment to the abstract. This source was included because a definition and other useful
information were included within the abstract. The only difficulty with this source was there was
no ability to check citations, specific research type, and the paper was referenced five times. As a
result, this source was appraised as moderate based on the information available.
Taylor and Francis Results
A breakdown of results for the Taylor and Francis database can be found in Table 3.3.
This table includes the study type, the definitions, and the dimensions. The data was rated
according to the value assessment. All definitions met the criteria of a high-value assessment.
Table 3.3: Taylor & Francis Database Definitions
Taylor & Francis Database
Source

Research
Method

Definition

Category/
Themes

Sources

Value
Assessed

over 20

Cited in
Other
Work
11

Lasoen, K. L. (2018). Two
ancient intelligence failure
postmortems. Comparative
Strategy, 37(5), 430-441.

QualMultiple
Case Study

Modern research into intelligence failures has identified four
main categories of obstacles: time and space, organization,
politicization, and problems of cognition. All four are present
in both historical documents. So are the classic problems such
as paucity of sources, noise, denial and deception, and the
many psychological pitfalls of analyzing intelligence" (p.436)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog

Karam, J. G. (2017).
Missing revolution: the
American intelligence
failure in Iraq,
1958. Intelligence and
National Security, 32(6),
693-709.

Qual-Single
Case Study

"is the product of two factors: the collection of information
from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in
Iraq’s ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to
assessing new information and their unwillingness to update
assessments of local Iraqi developments." (p.693). "Building
on Jervis, we define intelligence failures in their simplest form,
as a mismatch between intelligence assessments and realitywhat later information reveals." (p.694)

Mix- Org,
Cog,
Process
(Collectio
n/HUMIN
T)

over 20

7

H

Lillbacka, R. (2019). The
Finnish Intelligence
Failure on the Karelian
Isthmus in 1944. The
International Journal of
Intelligence, Security, and
Public Affairs, 21(1), 2548.
Gill, P. (2020). Explaining
Intelligence Failure:
Rethinking the Recent
Terrorist Attacks in
Europe. International
Journal of Intelligence
and
CounterIntelligence, 33(1)
, 43-67.

Qual-Single
Case Study

"intelligence failures are here defined as errors in collection
and/or analysis, and/or errors in decision based on intelligence,
having identifiable detrimental consequences in relation to
policy aims." (p.27)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Collection

over 20

1

H

Qual-Single
Case Study

"More recently, Greg Treverton suggests that most intelligence
or warning failures stem from “holding onto stories that events
have outmoded.” (p.49) " there should be significant shift in
those parts of the interactive intelligence process that receive
the most attention. As noted above, an examination of the
literature on strategic failure indicates its predominant concern
with the analysis–dissemination–policy nexus whereas tactical
counterterrorist failures occur more around them targeting–
store–collection–analysis nexus."" (p.54)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Process

over 20

4

H
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H

Ostergard Jr, R. L. (2020).
The West Africa Ebola
outbreak (2014-2016): a
health intelligence
failure?. Intelligence and
National Security, 35(4),
477-492.

Qual-Single
Case Study

"When taken together, these points represent a health
intelligence failure in the reporting of information, the
assessment of that information, and in the imagination of what
that information could mean in a state with weak institutional,
economic, and political capacities" (p.489)

Mix- Pol,
Cog,
Process

over 20

1

H

Davies, P. H. (2004).
Intelligence culture and
intelligence failure in
Britain and the United
States. Cambridge Review
of International
Affairs, 17(3), 495-520.

QualComparative
Case Study

"However, while there may be some marginal cases, and a very
real question of where failures of intelligence can merge with
failures of political policy, in practical terms a failure to
provide warning or the provision of a significantly inaccurate
assessment of a matter such as military strength constitutes a
failure of intelligence institutions to perform their allotted
tasks." (p.496-497)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Process
(collectio
n)

over 20

106

H

Evans, G. (2009).
Rethinking military
intelligence failure–
putting the wheels back on
the intelligence
cycle. Defence
Studies, 9(1), 22-46.

QualTheoretical

In summary, these are: overestimation; underestimation;
subordination of intelligence to policy; lack of communication;
unavailability of information; over-confidence; complacency;
received opinion (sometimes called ‘conventional wisdom’);
mirror-imaging; failure to link key bits of intelligence. Such
criterion have been commonly referred to in a wide variety of
academic texts which discuss the concept of intelligence
failure, especially where it relates to military defeat." (p.44,
footnote 5)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Process

over 20

28

H

Bar-Joseph, U. (1995).
Israel's intelligence failure
of 1973: New evidence, a
new interpretation, and
theoretical
implications. Security
Studies, 4(3), 584-609.

Qual-Single
Case Study

"Relying on empirical evidence provided by about fifteen cases
of surprise attacks since 1940, this orthodox school asserts that
intelligence failures are not the product of insufficient
information or of negligence or stupidity by intelligence
producers and consumers. Rather, these failures are the result
of inherent pathologies of the warning-response process that
affect "honest, dedicated, and intelligent men." (p.585). To a
large extent the failure was the outcome of various obstacles in
the warning-response process, as had always been argued by
proponents of the orthodox school. As is now evident,
however, the most critical obstacle to the translation of the
information which was available to Israel on the eve of the war
into a high quality strategic warning and a war-readiness state
of alert were unethical acts, consciously taken by the director
of Military Intelligence (DMI), Major General Zeira." (p.590)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Process,
Ethics

over 20

21

H

Hatlebrekke, K. A., &
Smith, M. L. (2010).
Towards a new theory of
intelligence failure? The
impact of cognitive
closure and discourse
failure. Intelligence and
national security, 25(2),
147-182.

QualTheoretical

"intelligence failure resides not in the strict technical confines
of the intelligence cycle, but primarily in the cognitive
processes among intelligence analysts and among those who
perceive the intelligence product.2 In this respect, the
intelligence cycle must be understood as function and not
organization,3... Functional and mental failure that evolves
beyond the strict technical and organizational boundaries of the
intelligence cycle is therefore manifested as discourse failure,
which expresses itself as the failure, ‘to identify, analyze, and
accept that a significant threat [exists]’.4 This failure arises
when one forgets that intelligence operators ‘are exposed not
only to the internal machinations of their respective institutions
but also to influences from society at large’.5" (p.148).
"Conceptually, intelligence failure represents ‘a
misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or
its military forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and
counterproductive to its own interests’.15. Shulsky and Schmitt
concur when they argue that ‘the heart of the problem of
intelligence failure, [is] the thought processes of the individual
analyst’.20 Similarly, Woodrow Kuhns also asserts that
‘intelligence failures are rarely a problem of collection but
generally one of interpretation’.21 A considerable body of
opinion thus holds that the causes of intelligence failure are to
be found predominantly in the human condition rather than the
technicalities of the intelligence process. From this
understanding it follows that intelligence failure, and especially
discourse failure, operates in two main dimensions: in the
analytical process and among those who perceive the final
intelligence product." (p.151)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog

over 20

33

H

45

Sloan, G. (2013). The
British state and the Irish
rebellion of 1916: An
intelligence failure or a
failure of
response?. Intelligence
and National
Security, 28(4), 453-494.
Barnea, A. (2017). The
Assassination of a Prime
Minister–The Intelligence
Failure that Failed to
Prevent the Murder of
Yitzhak Rabin. The
International Journal of
Intelligence, Security, and
Public Affairs, 19(1), 2343.
Wirtz, J. J. (1994). The Tet
offensive: intelligence
failure in war. Cornell
University Press.

Qual-Single
Case Study

"It has been termed ‘warning failure’. This usually precedes a
surprise attack that takes place in peacetime and leads to the
initiation of war." (p.459)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Process
(Collectio
n/HUMIN
T)

over 20

9

H

Qual-Single
Case Study

"There are many reasons for intelligence failures. But usually
they are related to a strategic surprise due to inaccurate
information, a lack of information, and ignoring relevant
information or inadequate assumptions (Gentry, 2008;
Johnston, 2005; Levite, 1987; Lowenthal, 2009; Sims &
Gerber, 2005, p. 17). Intelligence that fails to correctly read
and understand the intentions and capabilities of the adversary
(Handel, 2003) causes governments and armed forces to act
erroneously, often against their own interests (Shulsky &
Schmitt, 2002)." (p.25)
Failure to accomplish intelligence cycle tasks: Collection of
information, analysis, response & dissemination of warning
(p.13)

Mix- Org,
Cog

over 20

2

H

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog

over 20

161

H

Qual-Single
Case Study

Source & Study Type
Eleven studies of the sample were journal-based articles. Only one source was pulled
from a book. This source was added on the further research of various book reviews that were
pulled from the wider sample. Not surprisingly, the types of studies were largely case study
based. Lasoen (2018) and Davies (2004) were the only sources to use multiple case studies.
Eight sources only focused on single case studies, and only two authors focused their studies on
theoretical research. Overall, no studies were empirical.
Definition Results
Definitions varied across the sample. Very few sources referenced one common
definition. Sources that were excluded made no attempt to make any definition of intelligence
failure. Definitions varied in length and substance. As Gentry (2008) explained there is
discussion of “types” of intelligence failure. Several authors focused on flawed process, others
emphasized the role of warning or strategic surprise (Davies, 2004; Barnea, 2017; Sloan, 2013),
and other authors highlighted a multitude of reasons for intelligence failure and what they consist
of (Hatlebrekke, & Smith, 2010).
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Dimensions Results
All the results for the Taylor and Francis database attributed multiple dimensions to the
intelligence failures examined, in their respective studies. This aligned to claims that multiple
causes that play into an intelligence failure. All authors addressed policy, organizational, and
cognitive/ psychological aspects that helped to cause or underline various intelligence failures.
Lillbacka (2019), Karam (2017), Sloan (2013), and Davies (2004) placed particular emphasis on
the collection portion of the process as being a flawed aspect. Generally speaking, seven sources
highlighted a flaw in process as being one element that contributed to various examples of
failure.
Examples of Intelligence Failure
One method commonly used to expand on definitions can be done through example. The
Taylor & Francis search provided a plethora of examples, which was even more expansive than
anticipated. Out of the definitions (n=12) there were over 23 intelligence failures that were
referenced across the literature. Predictably the most cited intelligence failures were Pearl
Harbor, the Yom Kippur War (1973), 9/11, Operation Barbarossa, and the Iraq WMD case
(Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Referenced Intelligence Failures from Taylor & Francis Sample
JSTOR Results
The results of the JSTOR database can be found in Table 3.4. No timeframe restrictions
were used within the search. However, the search was limited in scope to accessible articles that
were searched on the criteria of “intelligence failure” being in the title. The JSTOR sample
provided n=6 definitions, and uniquely had the only source to claim intelligence failure could not
be defined. Over n=28 sources did not provide a definition at all. Only n=1 source was an
overlap repeat sample of Taylor and Francis. Unique to this sample, n=4 sources were excluded
due to issues of translation.
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Table 3.4: JSTOR Database Definitions
JSTOR
Source

Research
Method

Definition

Category/
Themes

Citations

Value
Assessed

over 20

Cited
in
Other
Work
56

Betts, R. (2007). Two
Faces of Intelligence
Failure: September 11 and
Iraq's Missing
WMD. Political Science
Quarterly, 122(4), 585606. Retrieved February
27, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable
/20202928
Gentry, J. (2008).
Intelligence Failure
Reframed. Political
Science Quarterly, 123(2),
247-270. Retrieved
February 27, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable
/20203011

QualTheoretical

No clear definition because intelligence failures come with
mixed results: successes and failures. "Being wrong for the right
reasons means little to citizens who must live with the result, but
it does provide a caution against drawing too many lessons from
a single failure." (p.606)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Threat
Actors
(D&D),
Process

QualTheoretical

"Intelligence fails if a state does not adequately collect and
interpret intelligence information, make sound policy based on
the intelligence (and other factors), and effectively act."(p.248).
"The inter-connectedness of functions within governments and
among states (and non-state actors) means we can identify six
general types of intelligence-related failures: threat warning
failure by intelligence agencies; leaders' failure to respond
effectively to threat warnings; opportunity warning failure by
intelligence agencies; leaders' failure to effectively exploit
opportunities; failure to recognize one's own vulnerabilities in
the context of other actors' intelligence and operational
capabilities, thereby giving other parties intelligence-related
opportunities; and failure to ameliorate one's self-known
vulnerabilities to physical attack and nonviolent manipulation
(p.249)"

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Threat
Actors

over 20

40

H

Bar-Joseph, U., & Levy, J.
(2009). Conscious Action
and Intelligence
Failure. Political Science
Quarterly, 124(3), 461488. Retrieved February
27, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable
/25655697

QualMultiple
Case Study

"Although we have identified several analytically distinct
sources of intelligence failure at different levels of analysis, we
should emphasize that most intelligence failures are the product
of the interaction of multiple factors at different levels. In an
unambiguous informational environment, psychological biases
have a much weaker impact and there are fewer opportunities for
the deliberate distortion of intelligence assessments. In an
inherently ambiguous informational environment, psychological
biases and other variables play a much greater role. Efforts at
strategic deception are most effective if they are informed by
psychological proclivities of the target and designed to exploit
them. Organizational cultures that are conducive to the free flow
of information can be compromised by a key intelligence official
who has an authoritarian management style and intolerance for
dissent. These relationships are complex and context dependent,
and as a result, there is no single path to intelligence failure, but
instead multiple paths." (p.476)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog
(Deliberate
Distortion)

over 20

31

H

Wirtz, J. (2018). When Do
You Give It a Name?:
Theoretical Observations
about the ISIS Intelligence
Failure. In Al-Istrabadi F.
& Ganguly S. (Eds.), The
Future of ISIS: Regional
and International
Implications (pp. 67-86).
Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution
Press. Retrieved February
27, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable
/10.7864/j.ctt1zctt19.7

Qual-Single
Case Study

"intelligence failure usually refers to the absence of a timely
warning about the occurrence of a discrete event. In other words,
if intelligence analysts fail to estimate what is about to occur,
where and when it will occur, and why it is occurring, and to
provide that estimate to policymakers in time for them to take
appropriate action, then the label “intelligence failure” is likely
to be used to characterize recent events." (p.67)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog,
Media,
Threat

Over 20

8

H

Betts, R. (1978). Analysis,
War, and Decision: Why
Intelligence Failures Are
inevitable. World
Politics, 31(1), 61-89.
doi:10.2307/2009967

QualTheoretical

"In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial
mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw
information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished
analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume
the products of intelligence services. Policy premises constrict
perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection.
Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than
organizational" (p.61)

Mix- *Pol,
Org, *Cog

Over 20

556

H

49

H

Turner, B. (1976). The
Organizational and
Interorganizational
Development of
Disasters. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 21(3),
378-397.
doi:10.2307/2391850

Thurston, C. (2013).
Intelligence Failure Is
More Than "Policy
Oversell". International
Studies Review, 15(4),
625-627. Retrieved
February 27, 2021, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable
/24032996

QualMultiple
Case Study

"Common causal features are rigidities in institutional beliefs,
distracting decoy phenomena, neglect of outside complaints,
multiple information-handling difficulties, exacerbation of the
hazards by strangers, failure to comply with regulations, and a
tendency to minimize emergent danger. Such features form part
of the incubation stage in a sequence of disaster development,
accumulating unnoticed until a precipitating event leads to the
onset of the disaster and a degree of cultural collapse.
Recommendations following public inquiries are seen as part of
a process of cultural readjustment after a disaster, allowing the
ill-structured problem which led to the failure to be absorbed
into the culture in a well-structured form." (p.365)

Mix- Org,
Cog

Over 20

1165

H

Book
Review

"Rovner hypothesizes that the intelligence-policy-making
relationship can fall into one of three "pathologies": neglect,
excessive harmony, or politicization. Neglect occurs when the
policymaker uses intelligence incorrectly or ignores it. Existing
research on this problem focuses on "noise in the system" and
the difficulty of communicating intelligence to the policymaker.
The second pathology, excessive harmony, arises when
intelligence professionals do not challenge policy beliefs, and
policymakers do not criticize intelligence conclusions. The cause
for intelligence failure in this case is based on proximity—the
intelligence professional and policymaker are too cozy to
challenge each other." (p.625)

MixPol,Org,
Cog, Public
(Constituen
cy)

1

0

L

Source & Study Type
All the sources were academic journal articles, with the exception of a book chapter from
Wirtz (2018). Once again, the study types reflected a similar pattern for Taylor & Francis. One
of the sources was a book review from Thurston (2013), and this was the only source to be
assessed as low relating to the sample. The remaining sources received a high value appraisal.
Three sources were theoretically oriented articles, two were multiple case studies, and one source
was a single case study.
Definition Results
The JSTOR sample provided one case where there was explicit mention of no clear
definition being available. Betts (2007) was the only source to claim no definition is available
due the existence of mixed results that occur between successes and failures that are inherent to
intelligence. This is a shift from Betts (1978) assessment that most intelligence failures can be
defined as more of a political and psychological event. Bar-Joseph & Levy (2009), Turner
(1976), and Gentry (2008) all elaborate on multiple variables that define intelligence failure, and
once again there was elaboration of types of intelligence failure.
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Dimensions Results
Most sources tended to highlight the similar three dimensions underlying intelligence
failure. Policy, organizational, and cognitive/psychological factors were mentioned, in varying
degrees across all sources. Turner (1976) was the only author who limited focus to two
dimensions. This article was accepted despite not mentioning “intelligence failure” in the title
(the term was in the abstract), though it was unique enough to include because it focused beyond
traditional intelligence organizations. Its examination looked at organizational workings in
business pertaining to the Aberfan disaster and two other cases. This source attributed the
features of failure to organizational, inter-organizational, and cognitive failures.
The results for JSTOR did illuminate some other factors not really examined from the
Taylor and Francis example. The role of threat actors was emphasized to a greater degree with
the sources of Betts (2007), Gentry (2008), and Wirtz (2018). The practice of denial and
deception was commonly discussed. The adage that the enemy gets a vote was better highlighted
in some of the results of this sample. Another attribute that was uniquely highlighted in this
sample was the role of the media. Gentry (2008) makes some mention of the media perceptions
of intelligence, and Wirtz (2018) discussed the role the media as an actor associated with
intelligence failure.
Examples of Intelligence Failure
The JSTOR final sample of definitions was smaller than Taylor & Francis. Despite this,
more examples of intelligence failure emerged. Some of the new additions include the Rise of
ISIL, the Chinese intervention during the Korean War, the Cyprus Crisis, Hurrican Katrina, and
several others that are depicted in Figure 3.2. Once again, the pattern of expanding cases of
intelligence failure emerged.
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Figure 3.2: Referenced Intelligence Failures from JSTOR Sample
Google Scholar Results
The Google Scholar breakdown of results can be found in Table 3.5. The years for this
search result were limited to 2009-2021. The search criteria of “intelligence failure” in the title
remained consistent to previous searches. Out of the sample of n=140 numerous exclusions were
made. Over n=43 sources were just citations and were not accessible articles. Unlike the other
searches, there were n=22 results that were not accessible. Over n=23 sources were overlapped,
from the Taylor and Francis and JSTOR. There was n=3 unique exclusions because they were
not relevant to intelligence failure and covered unrelated topics despite the search criteria. Out of
the remaining n=49 sources, only n=14 defined intelligence failure.
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Table 3.5: Google Scholar Search Engine Definitions

Source

Research
Method

Dahl, E. J.
(2013). Intelligenc
e and surprise
attack: Failure
and success from
Pearl Harbor to
9/11 and beyond.
Georgetown
University Press.

QualMultiple
Case Study

Copeland, T. E.
(2010).
Intelligence
failure theory.
In Oxford
Research
Encyclopedia of
International
Studies.
Firester, D.
(2011). Failure to
adapt; Intelligence
Failure and
Military Failure as
Functions of
Strategic Failure?.

Google Scholar (2009-2021)
Definition

Category/
Themes

Examples
Referenced

Citations

Value
Assessed

over 20

Cited
in
Other
Work
100

"Intelligence failures can take many forms, but a common
theme in major intelligence failures is that decision
makers have been surprised"(p.6). Lowenthal definition
cited on (p.7) with two others. Dahl definition, "failures
can involve the failure of the Intelligence Community to
produce the intelligence needed by decision makers, or a
failure on the part of the decision makers to act on that
intelligence appropriately." (p.7)

Mix- Pol
(Paradox
of
Strategic
Warning
(p.23)),
Org, Cog,

Pearl
Harbor,
9/11, East
Africa
Bombings

QualTheoretical

"Intelligence failures are commonly understood as the
failures to anticipate important information and events,
such as terrorist attacks. Explanations for intelligence
failure generally include one or more of the following
causal factors: organizational obstacles, psychological and
analytical challenges, problems with warning information,
and failures of political leadership. " (Abstract-- Limited
Access)

Mix- Pol,
Org, Cog

9-11, Iraq
WMD

UNK

5

M

QualMultiple
Case

"This paper asserts that there is reason to believe that
certain causal elements of alleged intelligence failures
reside more so in the province of politics, than in the
collection and analysis domain of intelligence tradecraft.
This is not to say that failures are exclusively of a political
nature, but that looking at politics and the relationship of
policymakers to the Intelligence Community yields a
preponderance of causal evidence." (p.4). Intelligence
failure and Military failure both share Zegart's adaptation
failure concept.
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Barnea, A. (2011).
Financial Crisis as
an Intelligence
failure. Competitiv
e Intelligence
Magazine, 14(2),
27-33.
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"Failure in human judgement, failure in coordination and
sharing of information, failure at the senior executive
level, failure of looking over the aggregation of threats"
(p.65)
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Wirtz, J. J.
(2016). Understan
ding Intelligence
Failure: Warning,
Response and
Deterrence.
Taylor & Francis.

QualMultiple
Case Study

" Indeed, it might be useful to think of intelligence failure,
strategic surprise and deterrence failure as three phases of
a single phenomenon Intelligence failure and surprise
attack generate an immediate strategic defeat for the
victim because they literally destroy the victim’s national
defense strategy. Surprise creates unnecessary wars, wars
that should have been avoided because a credible deterrent
had been created by the side victimized by surprise.
Paradoxically, as the theory of surprise will demonstrate,
it is the very existence of a significant asymmetry in
military capability that sets the stage for surprise to
occur." (p.2)
"Intelligence failures are distinguishable from more taskoriented intelligence errors, which are viewed as factual
inaccuracies in analysis, resulting from poor and/or
missing data. Intelligence failure is defined by Johnston
(2005, p. 6) as ‘systemic organizational surprise resulting
from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate
hypotheses’. These failures may be due, in part, to failed
analysis, but they can also be caused by other factors that
interact with the CI analysis process." (p.554)
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of Strategic
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Norman, A.
(2020).
Organizational
failure and
intelligence: A
framework for
understanding
intelligence
failure.
Rao-Chakravorti,
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(2018). Strategies
and responses to
intelligence
failure: an
organizational
view (Doctoral
dissertation,
Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology).

Qual- Case
Study

"frequently has dramatic and devastating consequences:
Failing to prevent terrorist attacks, not being able to
identify an impending attack, the inability to predict the
collapse of a state, of the iron curtain, the outbreak of a
civil war." (p.1)
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"intelligence failure is a remarkably complex and often
idiosyncratic phenomenon, and the scholarly debate
mirrors this reality. The lines between strategic and
tactical intelligence are often blurred, with unclear
applications or groups responsible for the production of
each type of intelligence. After reviewing the literature, I
conclude that a significant portion of the challenge of
intelligence reform lies in the multi-part structure of the
intelligence production cycle. Because different scholars
are analyzing different points of the cycle, they ultimately
arrive at vastly different conclusions about the causes of
intelligence failure and what constitutes best practices. "
(p.14)
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Røssaak, M. K.
(2017). Searching
for Weapons of
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Student
Journal, 9(1).
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(2012). The
Problem of
Intelligence
Failure: The Case
of the Yom Kippur
War
(1973) (Doctoral
dissertation,
Aberystwyth
University.).

Qual-Single
Case Study

"Intelligence failure can occur when a state fails in
collecting or analysing information, national leaders fail to
make sound policy on the disseminated intelligence or
fails to act effectively on the information received
(Gentry, 2008:249)."
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intelligence failure equals, “the inability of one or more
parts of the intelligence process- collection, evaluation
and analysis, production, dissemination to produce timely,
accurate intelligence on an issues or event of importance
to national interest,”7 is maintained by multifarious,
endemic and very often, self-reinforcing, analytical
obstacles, which hinder or distort the analytical accuracy
and clarity of the intelligence process, and erode the
warning-response process. As Jackson has noted, it is
feasible “…to consider the permanent challenges to
effective intelligence…in terms of interdependent
categories of limitations linked directly to the nature of
intelligence as element of politics.”8 From this
perspective, it is appears logical to foster the deduction
that, “intelligence failures are rarely unidimensional in
scope.”9 Per contra, as Bar-Joseph and Jack Levy have
systematized, “most intelligence failures are the product
of the interaction of multiple factors at different levels.
These relationships between factors are complex and
context dependent….”10" (p.7-8)

Mix: Pol,
Org, Cog,
Process,
Strategic,
Operation
al,
Tactical

Barbarossa
(1941),
Pearl
Harbor,
Korean
War
(1950), Tet
Offensive,
Yom
Kippur
War, Iraq
WMD

Over 20

0

H

Ozkan, O.
(2013). A law
enforcement
perspective to
intelligence
failure in mass
casualty terrorist
attacks by global
jihadist
movements: a
comparative study
of terrorist attacks
of September 11,
2001 and
November 15-20,
2003 (Doctoral
dissertation,
Rutgers
UniversityGraduate SchoolNewark).

QualMultiple
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"Intelligence failure can be defined as the inability of
intelligence community as well as policymakers to
anticipate or prevent incidents that result in unexpected
and undesired consequences." (p.1)
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Nutt, C. G.
(2019). Proof of
the Bomb: The
Influence of
Previous Failure
on Intelligence
Judgments of
Nuclear
Programs. Securit
y Studies, 28(2),
321-359.
Arve, S. (2019).
Prediction of
regime change is a
constant challenge
to intelligence
organizations.
What intelligence
lessons can be
learned from the
fall of the Shah in
1978?: Why did
the US
intelligence
community fail to
predict the fall of
the Shah? What
failure theory
explains it best?
What lessons may
be drawn from it?
Why was Israeli
intelligence more
successful in this
case? What may
we learn
combined from
the US failure and
the Israeli
success? How
does the case
match theory on
Regime Change
and what may we
learn?.
Brunson, D.
(2011). 2003 Iraq
War: intelligence
or political
failure? (Doctoral
dissertation,
Georgetown
University).

QualComparativ
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"An intelligence failure is an instance in which the
intelligence community errs. This can be a failure of
commission or omission; purported facts
prove untrue (that is, a false positive) or gathering threats
go unseen (that is, a false negative)." (p.328)
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"More specifically, it uses Dahl’s “Intelligence and
Surprise Attack” (2013), grouping of “Intelligence
Failure” theory into three “schools”; traditionalist,
reformist and contrarian. The traditionalists assert that
collection has worked and attributes failure mainly to
analysis and policy interpretation of analysis. Framework
theory is provided by scholars like Wohlstetter and Betts,
while cognitive problems are covered by Heuer. The
reformists take a more organizational view. They concur
concerning collection but blame failure on organizational
or bureaucratical malfunctions like insufficient sharing,
rather than cognitive problems and faulty analysis.
Prominent reformist scholars are Wilensky and Zegart."
(p.6)
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"Recall that intelligence failures occur when intelligence
fails to provide warning.63" (p.15)
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Source & Study Type
Given the expanse of Google Scholar there was a much more diversified pull of sources
and study types. Out of the sample n=2 of the sources were books (Dahl, 2013; Wirtz, 2016).
The Google Scholar pull included n=3 sources that were doctoral theses, and n=1 was a master’s
thesis. The search engine contained n=8 of the sources appraised at high value, n=5 of the
sources in this sample were rated as moderate value, and no sources were rated as low value.
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Case studies predominated the sample with n=5 being single case studies. Only n=2 of
the sources focused from a theoretical framework. Over n=6 of the sources used multiple case
studies as their selected research method. Similar to Taylor & Francis and JSTOR, a heavy
reliance on case qualitative research pervaded the sample. This also included the excluded
sources. Overwhelmingly, case studies were a common method. No studies included a
systematic review.
Definition Results
Similar to the databases there was no common unified definition that was referenced. It
was a myriad of puzzle pieces. Some definitions like Nokov (2012) focused on process and the
inability to warn of an impending attack. Other definitions like Arve (2019) adopted more of a
conceptual explanation that was framed off of Dahl (2013). Sources such as Ozkan (2013) and
Norman (2020), both highlighted the role of consequences as being tied to intelligence failure.
The sample contained more references pertaining to multiple variables and complexity
underlying the definitions of intelligence failure. Rao-Chakravorti (2018), Nokov (2012), and
Copeland (2010) all emphasized the role of multiple variables and complexity that defines
intelligence failure.
Dimensions Results
Similar results for coded dimensions were seen within the Google Scholar sample.
Policy/political, organizational, and cognitive explanations were common trademarks. Some
articles also mentioned the role of the threat as being a relevant variable. Common elements of a
failure to warn, the importance of process and the role of policymakers listening emerged as a
common trait in the results.
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Examples of Intelligence Failure
General references of the Google Scholar sample aligned with the results of previous
databases. Pearl Harbor, 9-11, Ira WMDs, and the Yom Kippur War were the most referenced
instances of intelligence failure. However, other cases also emerged. These included the East
Africa embassy bombings (1998), the Iran Revolution (1979), both the Libyan and Syrian
nuclear programs, and also of note the 2008 financial crisis (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3: Referenced Intelligence Failures from Google Scholar Sample
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Discussion
Since Pearl Harbor, the term intelligence failure has steadily increased over time. An Ngram viewer search through google provides one facet for how the frequency of usage has
changed over time (Figure 4.1). The highest peak of term usage occurred between 2005-2007.
Intelligence failure first appeared in books around 1951, one decade after Pearl Harbor.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the term has seen a steady increase over time. The
fact remains that intelligence failure remains a fixture of discourse. Along with increased usage,
the complexities and puzzles that surround intelligence failure continue to expand.

Figure 4.1: N-Gram Viewer of “intelligence+failure” (1800-2019)
Puzzles and Complexities
Intelligence presents a puzzle. The art and science of intelligence involve a process of
many actors who are both within the intelligence apparatus and outside of it. Intelligence
professionals and policymakers do not operate within vacuums. Many puzzle pieces exist
pertaining to intelligence failures. These same pieces may also play a role as they relate to
intelligence successes. However, the only way to present a claim of intelligence failure or
intelligence success is through defining them.

58

The systematic review provided important insights. The most obvious observation was
that many authors who included “Intelligence Failure” as part of their title did not define the
term. The primary emphasis across the board focused mostly on case studies or theoretical
concepts of research related to intelligence failure. The authors who did define intelligence
failure provided many different definitions as to what the concept or event is. Why? The answer
may lean towards inherent limitations to human knowledge between analysts and policymakers
alike (Hatlebrekke & Smith, 2010). Intelligence failure exists within complexity.
Returning to the puzzle concept there can be a temptation to focus on only certain aspects
of intelligence failure. These provide pieces of an incomplete picture of events leading up to
strategic surprise, or some form of grave consequences that undermined national interests.
Uncertainty pervades even after an intelligence failure occurs because of the volume of variables
and overlapping layers (Rao-Chakravorti (2018). All the definitions were inputted into
wordclouds.com to provide a visual of the confusion of varying pieces (Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Intelligence Failure Sample Word Cloud (wordclouds.com)
The puzzle begs the question of how do these pieces interact, and how do outside actors
influence them when an intelligence failure occurs? Dahl (2013) defined both strategic and
tactical intelligence but made no mention of the operational component. Is there an in-between
concept of operational intelligence, and how does this interact with the other layers? These are
difficult questions that some definitions address. Nokov (2012), Rao-Chakravorti (2018), and
Bar-Joseph & Levy (2009) provide the context for multiple variables at varying levels that
commonly overlap to create the conditions for an intelligence failure. These include issues of
politicization, policy-maker receptivity and action on intelligence, organizational issues, and
cognitive issues that relate to faulty analysis or collection.

60

"[…] intelligence failure is a remarkably complex and often idiosyncratic phenomenon,
and the scholarly debate mirrors this reality. The lines between strategic and tactical
intelligence are often blurred, with unclear applications or groups responsible for the
production of each type of intelligence" (Rao-Chakravorti, 2018, p.14).
The general dimensions were similar across the board. While these may have varied to
degree of emphasis, they were largely consistent. Intelligence failures involve a combination of
political, organizational, and cognitive factors (Bar-Joseph & Levy, 2009; Copeland, 2010;
Lasoen, 2018). Process also has numerous mentions across the sample that was examined. First,
political factors involve policies, politicization, or policymaker receptivity to intelligence. Note
the latter point can overlap with cognitive factors of bias. Analysts may be shaped by bias, but so
can policymakers and organizational leaders. Several definitions distinctly frame the role
policymakers’ actions and intelligence actions coalesce, but typically the weight of blame tends
towards policymakers (Betts, 1978; Firester, 2011).
Second, organizational structure and culture can also lead to potential intelligence
failures, which echo scholars highlighted within the literature review. This also includes interorganizational interaction and cultures that can contribute to disasters or intelligence failures
(Turner, 1976). Olson (2019) approached intelligence failure from the counterintelligence angle.
He stated, “More harm may have been done to the effectiveness of US counterintelligence over
the years by interagency sniping and obstructionism than by our enemies” (Olson, 2019, p.53).
Similar issues echo in debates of the complex interagency web of the national security state.
Third, cognitive factors like faulty analysis based on mirror imaging, and mind-sets of
conventional wisdom can result in intelligence failure (Evans, 2009; Hatlebrekke & Smith,
2010). Lillbacka (2019) provided a definition oriented on errors related to collection or analysis,
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or errors related to decisions. Ostergard (2020) focuses on a health intelligence failure but
focuses on faulty assessment and a failure of imagination at the outset of the Ebola outbreak. The
role of process falls across cognitive, organizational, and policy domains. However, if the
process is flawed due to biases or faulty assumptions it will cross into the other domains. The
reverse is also true. Organizational culture or policy guidelines can also sway cognitive
assessments of events. For example, an organizational culture and policy oriented towards
counterterrorism runs the risk of creating risks for analytical and collection focus on other areas
like the activities of state-actors.
A frequency table demonstrates key words and phrases (Table 4.1). The list goes from
greatest to least in terms of frequency count. Common substantive terms provide some insight to
some of the commonalities that were found within the sample, and this may provide further
insight for generating a deeper definition. Unlike the word cloud, this analysis combined
common words and phrases that were not combined due to tense issues. Terms that occurred in
three or more definitions are included in the table. Moreover, only a handful of sources used a
definition rooted from other sources. This shows while there were some common dimensions,
there was no consistent definition across the sample.

62

Table 4.1: Most Frequent Key Words and Phrases Among Definitions
Key
Words/Phrases
Cognition
Lack of
Information
Analysis
Collection
Policymaker
Warning Failure
Sources (HUMINT)

Database/Search Engine
Taylor & Francis
JSTOR Google Scholar
6
2
4

Warning Response
Process
Organization
Policy
Denial &
Deception
Consequence
Process/Cycle
Tasks
Complex

Frequency
Total
12

6
5
5
1
2
3

4
1
0
2
2
1

2
5
3
4
3
2

12
11
8
7
7
6

2
1
2

2
2
1

2
2
2

6
5
5

1
1

2
0

0
2

3
3

1
0

0
1

2
2

3
3

Some definitions address varying types of intelligence failure. This provides another
perspective for understanding distinct failures that play into the overarching concept of
intelligence failure. The following subsections address the definitions that were derived. They
generally cover the broad array of definitions that were discovered. The definitions generally
fall into types (conceptualization definitions), direct definitions, and complex definitions.
‘Types of Intelligence Failure’
Based on the results there are varying accounts to types of intelligence failure. Some
accounts are very specific, while others are much broader in nature. An issue presented in the
research pertains to instances of equivocating terms like warning failure and intelligence failure
(Sloan, 2013; Gill, 2020). Warning failure tends to be the associated attribute of some
intelligence failures. The central framework contends policymakers who needed to be warned
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were not (or did not take a warning seriously), which resulted to some form of intelligence
failure. Dahl (2011) argued the failure at Pearl Harbor was not rooted on strategic surprise but
can be traced to failure of collection (tactical warning) and poor receptivity of policymakers.
The expansion of the intelligence apparatus and the connection to multiple actors helps to
affirm that particular failures may be better attributed to certain types. All of these play a role in
causing or being an aspect of a particular intelligence failure. Gentry (2008) provided the clearest
conceptualization of intelligence failure types.
"The inter-connectedness of functions within governments and among states (and nonstate actors) means we can identify six general types of intelligence-related failures:
threat warning failure by intelligence agencies; leaders' failure to respond effectively to
threat warnings; opportunity warning failure by intelligence agencies; leaders' failure to
effectively exploit opportunities; failure to recognize one's own vulnerabilities in the
context of other actors' intelligence and operational capabilities, thereby giving other
parties intelligence-related opportunities; and failure to ameliorate one's self-known
vulnerabilities to physical attack and nonviolent manipulation." (Gentry, 2008, p.249)
These varying types of intelligence failure may happen in unison. For example,
intelligence agencies could miss an opportunity to exploit while also failing to recognize their
vulnerabilities. These types all underline a baseline definition that Gentry (2008) provided. He
argued that the state fails to process intelligence, and/or policymakers fail to make appropriate
policy that could prevent such a failure. Røssaak (2017) used the Gentry (2008) definition.
Dahl (2013) defined three schools on intelligence failure. This illuminates some of the
inherent limitations on how scholars have tended to adhere to certain aspects of intelligence
failure. Traditionalists tend to focus on psychological and political inevitability that low
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probability events will always slip through the cracks (Arve, 2019). Reformists focus on how
organizational improvement can prevent intelligence failure (Dahl, 2013; Arve, 2019).
Contrarians focus on the collection aspect as the guiding fault of intelligence failures (Dahl,
2019). On this basis, defining intelligence failure can be defined differently among different
types of schools of thought.
A deeper examination of the results demonstrates two broader categories that frame
intelligence failure. Direct and complex definitions both present utility for examining
intelligence failure. Direct definitions consisted of simplified definitions that were relatively
short and easy to comprehend. These definitions did not consist of multiple variables. Complex
definitions addressed many variables that underlined intelligence failure. These definitions
tended to be estimative given there were so many underlying factors.
Direct Definitions
Several definitions in the sample constitute direct or simple definitions. Direct definitions
consist of straightforward definitions that involve little nuance or flexibility. These are
definitions that are fixed, and they frame intelligence failure in this framework. For example,
one definition asserted that intelligence failures occur, “when intelligence fails to provide
warning” (Brunson, 2011, p.15). Warning pervades multiple other definitions as well. This
generally tends to lean towards the traditionalist view of warning-response elements being a key
factor. Davies (2004) elaborates on the general and a more direct definition of intelligence
failure:
"However, while there may be some marginal cases, and a very real question of where
failures of intelligence can merge with failures of political policy, in practical terms a
failure to provide warning or the provision of a significantly inaccurate assessment of a
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matter such as military strength constitutes a failure of intelligence institutions to perform
their allotted tasks." (Davies, 2004, p.496-497)
Wirtz (1994) provided an even more direct approach. He defined intelligence failure as a
failure to complete the intelligence cycle tasks (Wirtz, 1994). This takes aim at process as being
a predominant focus. This presents a direct definition that almost any person could understand.
Various factors still go into the process, but according to this framework intelligence failures
manifest through errors of process.
Lasoen (2018) explained intelligence failures fell within four main categories: time and
space, organization, politicization, and problems of analytical cognition. Other traditional issues
such as limited sources, noise & sound dilemmas, denial and deception, and the many other
cognitive limitations (biases) also add difficulty to intelligence analysis (Lasoen, 2018). Many of
these trends are echoed in other definitions, though to varying degrees.
Another direct definition posited intelligence failure, “frequently has dramatic and
devastating consequences: Failing to prevent terrorist attacks, not being able to identify an
impending attack, the inability to predict the collapse of a state, of the iron curtain, the outbreak
of a civil war" (Norman, 2020, p.1). This aligns well to consequentialist logic. Ozkan (2013)
similarly asserted a definition where the intelligence community and policymakers were unable
to predict or prevent events that resulted in undesirable consequence. An added facet to these
definitions included the mentioning acts of omission or commission relating to facts that were
not true, or threats that were unobserved (Nolan, 2020).
Direct definitions provide simplicity, but the most definitions reflected diversity of
nuance and factors. Direct definitions tended to focus on process, or the aspects that were
process specific. However, the intelligence process operates within larger processes that
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surround it. The interagency process provides one facet where the most basic intelligence tasks
become more complex, and also subject to external actors of various policy realms.
Complex Definitions
Complex definitions with the sample shared a greater focus towards estimative nuances.
Instead of being simple, they addressed a multitude of competing variables. The majority of
definitions that were found center around estimative failures or stipulations that “most”
intelligence failure share common definitional attributes. Other definitions characterized that
intelligence failures usually had certain attributes, but they did not go as far to claim these
applied to all intelligence failures.
For example, Dahl (2013) defined intelligence failures from both the policymaker
perspective and the intelligence perspective. He stated, “failures can involve the failure of the
Intelligence Community to produce the intelligence needed by decision makers, or a failure on
the part of the decision makers to act on that intelligence appropriately" (Dahl, 2013, p.7).
Something this definition missed was the opportunity to make it and/or. Intelligence failure may
be a failure from one side, or it may be both sides that failed to act appropriately. Setting this
critique aside, this definition provides a nuanced approach that addresses the role of
policymakers and intelligence professionals.
Copeland (2010) argued that the definition of intelligence failure generally entails one or
more causal factors ranging in scope, which is consistent to claims made by other scholars. Betts
(1978) and Wirtz (2018) both highlighted the qualifiers of factors they claim applied to most, but
not all intelligence failures. Fleisher & Wright (2010) used the Johnston definition of
intelligence failure, which includes the caveat such a failure of analysis or counterintelligence
analysis might be attributable. They are the only authors to extend the domain of intelligence
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failure to counterintelligence. The absence of including counterintelligence into the intelligence
failure discourse was further reflected in the results of intelligence failure examples, from this
sample. Surprisingly, no mention of espionage cases entered the discussion of cases within the
sample, and none of the excluded sources addressed the counterintelligence angle of intelligence
failure.
Complex definitions provide another facet to the intelligence failure debate. As the
results demonstrated there has been no shortage of intelligence failures. If anything, the list will
continue to grow in scope and scale. The fact is intelligence failures may take new forms and
shape amid changing structures. Direct definitions offer simplicity, but they are subject to change
beyond the traditional scope of state-centric intelligence structures. Complex definitions provide
the opportunity to identify gaps.
Filling Gaps towards a Working Definition
Though the definitions of the sample varied in scope, they do provide important facets
that help to shape the debate of intelligence failure. They provide a means to peel back the onion
to get to the basis of what is intelligence failure. The use of the term intelligence failure has
rapidly increased through use. The private sector, academia, and NGOs are all added actors that
need to be considered within the context of intelligence failure.
Surprisingly, few definitions addressed the value of secrecy as a guiding variable. The
compromise of secrecy that operates centrally to the world of counterintelligence did not find its
way into many definitions. Olson (2019) highlighted a plethora of espionage cases that have
undermined U.S. intelligence. These cases were not limited to a question of faulty analysis or
collection, although both are still critical. Cases of espionage undermine the very fabric that
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surrounds the definition of intelligence itself: secrecy. No definitions provide an explicit angle
that the compromise of secrets constitute the potential for intelligence failure.
Another missing aspect of intelligence failure pertained to law enforcement, and more
particularly how police intelligence has used informants. This extends beyond the traditional
examples of intelligence failure. Ozkan (2013) was the only source to approach intelligence
failure from a law enforcement angle. Unfortunately, he focuses solely on counterterrorism
dimension. Little examination pertained to the issue of negligence or questionable use of
informants. The latter can also demonstrate unique dimensions of an intelligence failure. The
role of ethics was not a pervasive theme found in this systematic review, but it is worth
mentioning as a factor that can draw lines between a perceived success and failure.
The basis for developing a working definition aims to include various components of
existing definitions and bridge the common dimensions that were found. The working definition
posited here also aimed to address some themes that were not commonly mentioned, such as
ethics and negligence. Both of these factors are relevant for all spheres of intelligence operating
in liberal democracies. For this reason, when trying to examine intelligence failures there is an
obligation to see beyond the traditional examples of strategic surprise or warning failure. Similar
to medical doctrine, the goal is to avoid inaccurate diagnoses.
Two case vignettes highlight unique cases that could be included to the realm of
intelligence failures on the basis of intelligence agency/law enforcement agency ethical conduct.
The aim of the case vignettes is to briefly illustrate other dimensions that are missing in the
intelligence failure debate and provide another bridge to a working definition. Common critiques
against the intelligence community tend to the focus on collecting and analyzing, while ignoring
the pervading possibility of unethical conduct undermining both. Bar-Joseph (1995) was the only
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source in the systematic review who focused on the question of ethical misconduct on the part of
leaders.
This undermining of social ethics/norms can also lead to an intelligence failure given it
can undermine public and policymaker trust in the intelligence or law enforcement apparatus.
The first vignette explains some of the background related to the Boston gangster James
“Whitey” Bulger, who functioned as an FBI informant for decades. The second vignette covers
another high-profile informant for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), who was
recruited by British intelligence. Both cases highlight instances where perceived success was
degraded to failure as more information of unethical practices were made public.
Case Vignette: James “Whitey” Bulger and the FBI
The case of James “Whitey” Bulger has become a legendary embarrassment of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. For the better part of 16 years Bulger was on the FBI most
wanted list (Murphy, 2020). It was later revealed that Bulger bribed his handler, killed FBI
informants that his handler told him about, and was given early warning to evade capture
courtesy of his handler (Bloom, 2002; Boeri, 2008; Murphy, 2020).
During the 1980s the FBI was directed to investigate organized crime to facilitate
Department of Justice prosecutions. The Italian Mafia/La Cosa Nostra (LCN) also known as the
Mafia had gained a significant foothold in the United States and was engaged in a vast array of
criminal activity (Bloom, 2002). As a result, a significant number of incentives to agents and
organizational focus was transfixed specifically on the LCN (Bloom, 2002). The problem with
this logic became the potential another organization (other than LCN) would exploit the void,
which is what occurred with Bulger’s gang.
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Whitey Bulger grew up in South Boston and became a member of the Winter Hill Gang.
The organization was part of the American Irish Mafia. Activities of Bulger’s organization
ranged from murders, gambling rackets, loan sharking, and political corruption. In the 1970s,
Whitey Bulger and his Co-Boss Stephen Flemmi became informants to the FBI. Both men were
recruited by James Connolly (Bloom, 2002). Connolly was a childhood friend of Bulger and had
a successful career of recruiting organized crime informants (MacKenzie, Karas, & Muscato,
2005).
Bulger and Flemmi were pivotal to providing information on the Patriarca Crime Family
in Boston (Bloom, 2002). The Patriarca organization was part of what was known as ‘The
Commission’, which consisted of the major mafia crime families in the United States.
Ultimately, the Patriarca Family was prosecuted and imprisoned (Bloom, 2002; MacKenzie,
Karas, & Muscato, 2005). The end result was the Winter Hill Gang assumed their criminal
rackets. Bulger used his handler and the FBI as top cover from prosecution. The apparent success
of the operation enabled Bulger to continue his activities until his escape in 1995 (Murphy,
2020). He obtained information on informants within his own organization and killed them.
Bulger committed 11 murders while he was an informant, from 1970-1990 (Bloom, 2002;
Goodnough, 2011).
Case Vignette: Freddy Scappaticci and British Intelligence
From 1969-1998 the British were engulfed in a counterinsurgency conflict known as the
Troubles in Northern Ireland (Leahy, 2015). The source of the conflict goes much further but can
broadly be painted as a sectarian conflict between Irish Catholics who sought unification with
Ireland, and Irish Protestants who sought to remain as part of Britain. As early as 1969 it was
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clear, “informers and agents again formed a crucial part of an intelligence-led strategy against
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)” (Leahy, 2015, p.7).
Freddie Scappaticci served as a top official for the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
counterintelligence unit known as “the Nutting Squad” from the 1970s and early 1990s
(Cochrane, 2013). During his tenure, Scappaticci allegedly killed numerous informants and
suspected informants (Cochrane, 2013). It is alleged that Scappaticci was among the most
important informants who were recruited from British Military Intelligence and was given the
codenamed “Stakeknife” (Leahy, 2015). This claim is affirmed by an Army source who claimed
“Stakeknife” saved upwards of 180 lives, prevented numerous attacks, and provided locations of
weapons (Leahy, 2020).
The British Irish Rights Watch (BIRW) alleged during Scappaticci’s tenure in IRA
counterintelligence, over 50 people were killed (Cochrane, 2013). The extent of criminal
involvement in this case far outpaces the Bulger case. Lomas (2019) contends the case of Freddie
Scappaticci demonstrates how British Military Intelligence ignored criminal activities as a
tradeoff for “high-grade” intelligence. Cochrane (2013) specifies that Scappaticci denies any
involvement as an informant, but the evidence pertaining to his informant status and activities is
hefty.
In the late 1970’s, Scappaticci allegedly become an informant for the British Military
Intelligence Force Research Unit (FRU), following internal disagreements he had within the IRA
(Leahy, 2015). The successful compromise of top IRA members is attributed as one of the causes
for the IRA coming to the peace table in the 1990s and ending the military war against the
British (Leahy, 2015). This facet meets the criteria of showing that this intelligence failure
appeared to be an intelligence success. In an odd twist, this case reflects an intelligence failure
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that both the British and the IRA have sought to conceal due to mutual embarrassment since the
revelations of “Stakeknife” were made public (Cochrane, 2013). The latter denial relates more to
a matter of embarrassment.
The domestic threat presented in this case was a counterterrorism threat. This makes it
distinguishable from standard organized crime activity. However, while the threat may be
different in the nature, the rationale used for obtaining a compromised source was similar. The
counterterrorism component explains why British Military Intelligence was placed in charge of
operations in Northern Ireland (Cochrane, 2013).
The weakness in this case vignette is that Freddie Scappaticci has never been arrested and
still denies any role as an informant to British Intelligence (Cochrane, 2013). However, there is
broad agreement that Scappaticci was “Stakeknife” from former key players within the IRA and
officials who worked in British Military Intelligence (Leahy, 2015).
A Working Definition
The core aim of the systematic review was to generate a deeper working definition of
intelligence failure. This was done through examining common patterns and themes that occur
among the definitions themselves, as well as the broader attributes the sources addressed. The
variance of types of intelligence failure, absolute definitions, and estimative definitions highlight
there is diversity among how intelligence failure has been defined. However, pulling together
these various aspects to synthesize their patterns is vital towards building a working definition.
However, this sample cannot close all gaps. No synthesis can completely close the gaps, and for
this reason case vignettes provide some insight to the blind spots that exist.
Both of the case vignettes highlight unique incidents where collection and analysis were
used as a means to catch “the big fish”. Initially, both cases represented law enforcement and
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military intelligence successes early on. As the methods and choice of informants became public,
both cases have turned into examples of questionable ethical means. The heart of these examples
highlights ethical dimensions and informant handling that can also undermine intelligence
operations. For this reason, these vignettes serve to expand an avenue that the sample left as a
void.
Koshinsky (2020) conducted a case study titled Intelligence Failure: The Puzzle of
Robert Hanssen. The case study sought to expand on existing literature on intelligence failure
and apply it specifically to a counterintelligence related case that centered from a law
enforcement agency. More importantly, the case study developed a working definition of
intelligence failure. Based on the systematic review this definition may provide a good starting
framework that bridges both the estimative and absolute definitions of intelligence failure.
“An intelligence failure is an event that entails systematic breakdown caused by multiple
factors that led to serious consequences due to negligence through commission or
omission, which could reasonably have been identified at the time.” (Koshinsky, 2020,
p.8).
This definition does provide a start. Nutt (2019) also highlighted the role of omission and
commission relating to intelligence failures. An important facet this definition aimed to resolve
was the propensity for hindsight bias. Dahl (2013) explained the Reformist school in particular
had the limitation of tending to lean on the weight of hindsight or 20/20 bias. No other definition
examined within the systematic review aimed to elaborate qualifiers such as judging acts based
on what could be reasonably identified at the time, with existing technologies. This definition
aimed to fill that void, in part.

74

Based on the systematic review of 33 varied definitions, and the expansion of less-known
cases related to ethics the definition of Koshinsky (2020) requires further adjustment. Using an
estimative approach that reflects intelligence language can function as a future hypothesis for
future research. Thus, an amended working definition for intelligence failure also includes a subdefinition including ethical intelligence failure, like those rare cases where ethical conduct
became a central feature of turning a perceived intelligence success into an intelligence failure.
The latter definition provides a future avenue to further explore, which is consistent with the
fringe vignettes that were presented.
The general framework for developing these definitions was derived from McPherson et
al., (1998). The verbiage has been adjusted to reflect the intelligence field of study. The
definitions derived aim to be: (1) simple & easily understood by a wide audience (2) have utility
for academics, practitioners, and policymakers to make informed judgements (3) have utility to
state and local law enforcement (4) recognize linkages between various actors (5) be specific and
preferably measurable or quantitatively assessable (6) aim to reflect current & emergent
knowledge on intelligence studies.

An intelligence failure is a catastrophic event derived from a precedent event or series of
intelligence-related multi-level (Strategic/Operational/Tactical) errors leading to the
undermining national interests/security, law enforcement investigations, or critical
business assets. Such errors could be reasonably known or were identified prior to their
occurrence. They entail systematic intelligence-policy (police intelligence-prosecutor or
private sector intelligence-corporate) apparatus or multi-dimensional factors like policy,
organizational, or cognitive dynamics that were successfully exploited by a threat actor.
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An ethical intelligence failure is an event or series of intelligence-related events that
leads to serious consequences (typically critical constituent/public outcry) and entails
evidence of negligence (professional, ethical, or legal) through commission (action) or
omission (inaction), which could have likely and reasonably been remedied at the time.
Similar dynamics at play with intelligence failure may also be present with an ethical
intelligence failure.
Opportunities: Establishing a Framework
Based on the categories and definitions there is a great opportunity to produce a
conceptual framework that pulls in estimative factors used within the IC. The working definition
developed here can help to provide a guide for developing indicators, in addition to the sample
systematic review. This may provide utility for practitioners and academics alike. A working
definition that synthesizes various factors or categories provides a building block looking
forward. The aim looking ahead should be to develop a probability chart that speaks the
intelligence language. An estimative framework may help to better measure (though subjectively
at this point) various indicators related to intelligence failure.
The role of probability has long been discussed within intelligence practitioner circles
and Intelligence Studies more broadly. Sherman Kent’s model of probability provides an early
framework for understanding probabilities that go into intelligence assessments. Many
definitions in the systematic review similarly paid attention to qualifying language for defining
intelligence failure. Kent (1964) does not include absolutes on either end relating to intelligence
assessments (Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Kent’s Probability Chart (Chart taken directly from Kent, 1964, p.55)

Kent (1964) acknowledged the challenge of getting this model accepted in terms of an
organizational standard and understood by the clients who were confused with probability (or
estimative) language. Fortunately, time has vindicated Kent’s efforts. While the percentages have
changed, the framework is now uniformly adopted under the guidance of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence as of 2007 (Fingar, 2017). The current breakdown of
assessments is directly taken from Intelligence Community Directive 203. Table 4.3 is taken
directly from ICD 203 as it was updated in 2015.
Table 4.3: ICD 203 Probability Chart (Chart taken directly from Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, 2015, p.3)

ICD 203 specifies not to mix the terminology depicted in the columns (Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, 2015). This provides the consistency that Sherman Kent sought
to instill as an organizational best practice. It is also important to note that ICD 203 also
elaborates to ensure that confidence level cannot be combined with the degree of likelihood
(Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015). This is an important distinction because
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confidence level (high, medium, or low) is distinct from degree of likelihood (Friedman &
Zeckhauser, 2014). Confidence level refers to the judgement of an event or development
changing the assessment of degree of likelihood (Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
2015). However, consumers of intelligence tend to equate the two concepts (Friedman &
Zeckhauser, 2014).
The indicator framework (Table 4.4) morphs the ICD 203 chart to address judgments of
intelligence failure. The framework encapsulates some of the multi-faceted dynamics that occur
within intelligence failures. This also helps to potentially apply the working definition that can
be used for future case study research. This framework was derived through common dimensions
found across the sample, and also from the insights presented from scholars within the literature
review.
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Table 4.4: Intelligence Failure Indicators Chart (Chart amended from Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, 2015, p.3)
Intelligence Failure Estimative Chart (amended from ICD 203 probability chart (ODNI, 2015)

Verbal Standard
Percent Assessed
Dimensions
Indicators
Indirect
politicization
present
Direct
politicization
present
Inadequate
Objectives
Policy (Strategic) Failure to head
early warning
Negative
consequence
Political
Fragmentation
Threat Surprise
Achieved
Negligence
Failure to
implement
reasonable
reforms
Leadership
politicization
present
Demonstrable
Bias (Groupthink)
Organizational
Culture and
Structure
(Operational)

Cognitive
(Tactical)

almost no chance
very unlikely
unlikely roughly even chance likely
very likely
almost certain
remote
highly improbable improbable roughly even odds probable highly probable nearly certain
01-05%
05-20%
20-45%
45-55%
55-80%
80-95%
95-99%

Organizational
Fragmentation/
Information
Sharing (External)
Organizational
Fragmentation/
Information
Sharing (Internal)
Negative
Consequence
Threat Surprise
Achieved
Negligence
Not Relevant
Not independent
of political
consideration
Not Timely
Not based
onAvailable
Sources of
Information
Demonstrable
Bias
Negative
Consequence
Threat Surprise
Achieved
Negligence
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Cannot be assessed

Assessing intelligence failures constitutes a form of intelligence assessment. Thus, this
framework potentially can help bridge academic inquiry to intelligence analysis. The framework
relies on subjective judgement, but it provides a conceptual framework for critically assessing
indicators common to intelligence failure. Based on analysis of the evidence, a scholar can assess
the estimative degree of certainty an indicator was present to a suspected intelligence failure. The
framework provides a potential for practical application related to judging intelligence failures. It
can help visualize particular indicators that are most present based on the evidence that was
evaluated.
Limitations
Various limitations exist in this study. These limitations range in scope. The limitations
on the systematic review focus primarily on selection criteria, a single-researcher, and limited
technological support such as cloud technology or other technologies that can amount significant
samples of content quickly. As a result, the sample size is smaller for this systematic review than
ideal. The use of a purposive sample adds further limitation, particularly as it pertains to
generalizability to the wider array of intelligence failure literature.
The first limitation pertains to the value assessment of sources and selection of
definitions. This process was modified to take a holistic approach to focusing on source value,
and not necessarily the substance of the definitions themselves. If the author made an honest
effort to define the concept or idea of intelligence failure, then further assessment of the source
itself based on objective criteria. The definition of Barnea (2011) and Turner (1976) were
exceptions for addition. Their ability to elaborate on failures outside of the standard intelligence
apparatus provided wider perspective to how intelligence failures can also play out in the
business sector. Hence, excluding them may have presented a bigger problem issue pertaining to
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bias than to the inclusion criteria. Some definitions were not as clear or could be considered to be
on the edge of inclusion. Decisions for inclusion were based if they added substantive knowledge
to the research question.
The method for systematic review assessment specifically related to definitions of
intelligence failure has not been previously tested. The lack of application to previous research
presents a limitation on its validity, but it also may prove to be a useful building block. Part of
the rationale for not emphasizing the focus of weight on definitional substance was to allow for a
wider possibility for accepting definitions that may not commonly be known or heard of, which
may present issues of author or selection biases. However, a focus on source rigor was
emphasized for assessing the value. This is because it is understood that the definition applied to
a broader context. An author may use a simple definition but provide significant elaboration on
causal themes or categories.
A further limitation for generalizability exists given the methodology is qualitative/nonstatistical and due to qualitative sampling lesser inter-rater reliability can be assured (Roberts,
1989). The research was not done by a team, and so some judgements were based on the best
judgement of the researcher. The use of clearly articulated based categories and search terms
aimed to mitigate this issue to the greatest extent possible. The coding of categories and
subsequent indicators may be subject to other interpretations given the fact this is not being
conducted with a group of researchers. A critical component of systematic reviews is
replicability (Temple University Library, 2020). However, it must also be noted that quality over
quantity was maximized through a focused search regimen. An aim to mitigate replicability was
to focus on quality, but this comes at the cost of broader generalizability.
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Stringent and consistent search criteria were used to mitigate some of these limitations.
The specifications for inclusion and exclusion criterion aimed to make the process transparent,
and thereby mitigate some limitations with replicability. Some sources that were originally
included were excluded after further review and consultation. Perhaps the most abundant fact
relating to limitations applies to the topic itself. Intelligence failure is rooted within limited
knowledge. Access to sources and a myriad of variables make intelligence failure complex, and
the understanding of it is limited. The lack of empirical research that is specific to variables of
intelligence failure further limit the scope and range of operationalizing a definition.
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Conclusion
As the world grows more inter-connected vulnerabilities have also grown more
interconnected. These vulnerabilities might create conditions of the next intelligence failure. This
only provides half the story. Vulnerabilities also present the potential for better capabilities.
Growing inter-connection can also create opportunities for intelligence success. As governments
seek to enhance interoperability and expand partnerships there exists risks and opportunities. A
link or set of links can lead to the calamity of intelligence failure, or they may present
opportunities to create intelligence success. Intelligence failure no longer exists as a concept
limited to the confines of shadowy intelligence agencies who work for policymakers.
Intelligence failures and intelligence successes apply to other domains. These domains include
law enforcement, the world of business, non-governmental organizations, and academia.
Some scholars like Betts (1978) and Wohlstetter (1962) argued intelligence failures are
inevitable. The evidence of this systematic review demonstrates intelligence failures have
multiple variables and these variables operate differing levels across cases. This may very well
make some intelligence failures inevitable (but not all). Despite the mixture of definitions there
are common themes of policy, organizational, and cognitive dynamics that play out through a
complex process known as the intelligence cycle. The term intelligence cycle may be a
misnomer. A better term may be intelligence-policy cycle, or what Gill & Phythian (2018) call
the intelligence web. The vast body of research suggests both intelligence and policy bleed over,
into the broader interagency process.
A core aim of the systematic review was to answer the question of what is intelligence
failure? Other questions pertained to if there was a commonly accepted definition or if there
were common dimensions. The systematic review provides proof that intelligence failures are a
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complex phenomenon that have multiple variables often overlapping. These include multiple
acting layers that are internal and external to the intelligence apparatus of a government,
business, or non-governmental organization. Internal layers include organizational and cognitive
dynamics. External layers include inter-organizational dynamics, policymakers, and the media. A
working definition sought to define these dynamics through bridging absolute and estimative
definitions.
Ultimately, the development of this working definition can frame a pathway for future
research and conceptual development. The literature review, systematic review, and development
of a working definition forge an initial skeleton of a framework that highlights various aspects of
intelligence failure. These building blocks create potential for future conceptual application to
case studies. Through aligning a common language, a framework of estimative assessments
might help to bridge the gap of practitioner and the ivory tower (and vice versa).
Based on the systematic review two vignettes were presented to highlight how
intelligence failure may extend into other areas that were not found during the literature review
and were not included in the pulled sources being analyzed. A common critique of some
intelligence failures was inadequate collection or more explicitly Human Intelligence
(HUMINT). Karam (2017) explicitly addressed deficiencies of HUMINT as it related to the Iraq
WMD saga. The vignettes provide another means to examine collection. They provide brief
cases of how unethical use of HUMINT can also lead to instances of ethical intelligence failure.
Future Research
Future research may unlock greater insights in three distinct methods that can expand the
current discourse. The first form of research is expanded systematic reviews that broaden the
scope of this inquiry. A second form of research is applying the estimative framework model
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proposed from this inquiry to case studies to analyze particular dynamics. A final area of future
research to examine pertains to the political economy of intelligence failure.
Expanding Systematic Reviews
Future research should consider a broader application of systematic reviews into the area
of intelligence success and intelligence failures. Dahl (2013) and Bar-Joseph & McDermott
(2017) provided an excellent basis for examining several case studies applying both to
intelligence success and intelligence failure. Expanding the search criteria to examine the
definitions existing across the broad expanses of databases can potentially unlock patterns and
bring greater clarity to both concepts. It might also illuminate how some of the faults attributed
to intelligence failures may also help in creating intelligence successes. A potential example of
this might be the issue of compartmentalization. Compartmentalization may have been a factor
that worked in favor of terrorists, but are there cases where it prevented espionage? This presents
a tradeoff.
Expanding the search criteria can also help enhance the ability to generalize results and
reduce the limitations that exist in this inquiry. This includes expanding to other databases or
using broader search criteria to include key words. Another option is to extend this inquiry more
towards a meta-analysis that can focus on variances of particular variables based on their
frequency per article. De Mauro, A., Greco, M., & Grimaldi, M. (2015) conducted an analysis on
the term Big Data examining the abstracts of over 1500 articles using the term in the title or
abstracts, and then examined the frequency of key words and phrases within the abstracts to
develop themes and a definition. The rationale for focusing on ‘big data’ mirrors some of the
definitional issues identifiable with intelligence failure. A similar analysis of key words in
abstracts can help confirm or deny the themes examined for this systematic review.
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Another facet that systematic reviews may be useful for relates to addressing the number
of intelligence failures that are referenced. One of the surprising results of the included studies
for this inquiry was the expanse of cases referred to intelligence failure. An expanded study can
further illuminate patterns relating to what cases authors describe as intelligence failures. Are
there similar categories and themes that were found within this systematic review? Are there
other categories and themes that were missed within this review? A guiding question for such a
study would concerns the issue if researchers and/or practitioners over-diagnosing or
underdiagnosing intelligence failure (or intelligence success)?
Systematic reviews typically are aimed at expanding knowledge in the medical field.
Medicine echoes a similar puzzle-based approach to intelligence. Uncertainties exist, yet pieces
of the puzzle can be systematically analyzed to get closer to a proper diagnosis. The ailment of
intelligence is the specter of intelligence failure. Systematic reviews geared towards
consolidating and expanding the diverse array of literature can potentially help narrow a
diagnosis or prevent the issues of over-diagnosis.
Future Case Studies
Much has been written about the plethora of case studies pertaining to intelligence
failure. They are far ranging in scope. However, little has been done about using a tool or
framework for assessing case studies at large. The results section provided dozens of examples
of intelligence failure, but little explanation exists of how to assess them with any degree of
uniformity. Rao-Chakravorti (2018) explains the vastly different conclusions through the study
of intelligence failures are reflective of the propensity to focus only on certain facets of the
intelligence cycle they derive divergent conclusions to remedy the issues.
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The conceptual framework derived from this inquiry might serve as a steppingstone to
examining intelligence failure case studies more broadly. The framework aligns with current
intelligence analysis standards for estimation of various components. While this is a
subjective/qualitative framework, it might prove utility for putting pieces of the intelligence
failure puzzle in context.
Many case studies abound in familiar intelligence failures such as Pearl Harbor, the
Iranian Revolution, 9-11, and Iraq WMDs. There is no doubt highlighting and defining
intelligence success case studies would provide a comparative picture, which aligns with Dahl
(2013) and Bar-Joseph & McDermott (2017). However, they also ignore that there are other
intelligence failures to assess. These range from counterintelligence to all the other numerous
functions of intelligence. The two vignettes of “Whitey” Bulger and Freddie Scappaticci present
opportunities to expand into case study research on ethical intelligence failures.
Undoubtedly, another venue to expand on case study research is in the field of business
intelligence and non-traditional sources that are part of the intelligence apparatus. The list of
potential case studies on intelligence failure is growing with actors like defense contracting firms
(i.e., Edward Snowden), university research espionage, or a major corporation hacking (i.e.,
Sony).
Investigating the Political Economy of Intelligence Failure
The analysis of diagnosing intelligence failure naturally evolves to a question of costs.
Studies related to the political economy can further enhance a broader understanding of
intelligence failure. Enders & Sandler (2012) examined various statistical and economic concepts
related to terrorism in their book The Political Economy of Terrorism. Through using various
economic models and statistic models the research provides an important perspective for costs,
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benefits, and tradeoffs that pertain to terrorism. It also provides insight to the costs of terrorism.
9-11 was estimated to have cost the United States over $80 billion, and also equated to an
enormous death toll (Enders & Sandler, 2012). Another angle to address intelligence failure is
the political economy it operates within. Terrorism does not constitute the only basis that
intelligence failures occur. What about the costs of failing to predict a conflict within the South
China Sea? What about the tradeoffs between civil liberties and the cost of guarding against the
next intelligence failure?
Since 9-11, both the intelligence community and Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) have grown rapidly. The 9-11 terrorist attacks and expanded globalization both help
explain this expansion. Questions that remain entail has this reduced the number of intelligence
failures or has it only created higher expectancy to not get it wrong? Amid 17 intelligence
agencies are there diminishing returns associated with such expansion?
One such hypothesis may claim that as the number of intelligence agencies increase, so
does the likelihood of diminishing returns for intelligence success, and thus increases the
likelihood of intelligence failure. The law of diminishing returns suggests as resources (land,
capital, or labor) are invested to a given plot the yield will increase to a tipping point when et
ceteris paribus, and further investments will lead to a loss of output (Shephard & Färe, 1974).
The original analogy posited by Turgot related to laborers working on a restricted piece of land
(Shephard & Färe, 1974).
Expanding this to intelligence failure one could posit that as intelligence agencies
increase there is a point to which their product (intelligence, early warning, and
counterintelligence) decreases leading to increased likelihood of intelligence failure (or less
likelihood of intelligence success). Figure 5.1 provides a depiction of this hypothesis. Such a

88

claim may be extended to other resources like intelligence sharing or interoperability, which in
this case is the balancing act of secrecy with information.

Figure 5.1: Intelligence Proliferation and the Law of Diminishing Returns Hypothesis
Thompson (2015) doctoral thesis titled Prolegomenon to a Political Economy of
Intelligence and Security: Can Microeconomic Analysis Explain Success or Failure in
Intelligence Cooperation? examined how microeconomics theories help explain the cooperation
(or lack of cooperation) between intelligence organizations of the United States and United
Kingdom. The framework of institutional costs was empirically tested in the thesis. This
constitutes another direction future research can explore amongst U.S. Intelligence Agencies or
varying governmental levels that deal with intelligence, and potentially mitigate the likelihood of
failure.
Lastly, final hypothesis worth future inquiry that also links political economic theory and
intelligence failure/success may pertain to the consumer expectations that may be tied to an
increase of intelligence agencies. Naturally, one might assume as intelligence spending and
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organizational structures expand then consumers (the public and policymakers) will expect a
higher likelihood of intelligence success. This highlights the concern Gentry (2008) and
Lowenthal (2008) both express regarding a public and policymaker base that holds unrealistic
expectations for intelligence. Figure 5.2 depicts how this might look. The empirical hypothesis to
test would be that as the number of intelligence agencies increase, consumer expectations for
intelligence success will also increase.

Figure 5.2: Intelligence Proliferation and Consumer Expectation Hypothesis
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